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Are Some Animals More Equal than Others? Animal
Rights and Deep Ecology in Environmental Education
Article · November 2015
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Are Some Animals More Equal than Others? Animal Rights
and Deep Ecology in Environmental Education
Helen Kopnina, Leiden University and The Hague University, The Netherlands, & Mickey
Gjerris, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Abstract
This article focuses on the role of ethical perspectives such as deep ecology and
animal rights in relation to environmental education, arguing that such perspec-
tives are well-placed to reposition students as responsible planetary citizens. We
focus on the linkage between non-consequentialism, animal rights, and deep ecol-
ogy in an educational context and discuss the broader issue of ethics in education.
Finally, we discuss how the inclusion of deep ecology and animal rights perspec-
tives would improve current environmental education programs by deepening the
respect for non-humans and their inclusion in the ethical community.
Résumé
L’article porte sur le rôle des perspectives éthiques telles que l’écologie profonde et
les droits des animaux en lien avec l’éducation environnementale, et avance que
ces perspectives sont bien placées pour faire des élèves des citoyens planétaires
responsables. Il met en évidence les liens entre le non-conséquentialisme, les droits
des animaux et l’écologie profonde dans un contexte éducatif et aborde la question
plus large de l’éthique en éducation. Enfin, cet article se penche sur l’amélioration
possible des programmes d’enseignement environnementaux actuels par
l’intégration de perspectives en écologie profonde et en droits des animaux grâce
à l’approfondissement du respect pour les non-humains et leur inclusion dans la
communauté éthique.
Keywords: animal rights, anthropocentrism, deep ecology, education for sustain-
able development, environmental education, environmental ethics, pluralism
Introduction
Research has demonstrated that care for the environment is strongly correlated
with deeper respect and care for animal rights1 (e.g., Johnson, Garrity, &
Stallones, 1992). Despite some distinct positions in environmental ethics, and
different zoo-centric positions focusing on animal rights, the perspectives of
deep ecology and animal rights perspectives can be seen as extensions of care
for the environment and animals that can supplement each other, even though
they might sometimes come into conflict (Callicott, 1988, 1999). In this article
we focus on the many situations where deep ecology and animal rights positions
Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, 20, 2015 109
are able to reinforce each other—instead of the situations where they come into
conflict. However, in order to understand how perspectives as diverse as deep
ecology and animal rights can be unified under a common objective, we need to
briefly address the differences between them.
Deep ecology and animal rights are largely based on attempts to affirm an
independent place for nature and animals in ethical reflection by arguing, dem-
onstrating, making likely, pointing to, and claiming nature’s ethical importance
in itself and its associated rights. While the range between deep ecology and
animal rights perspectives is wide, many authors have argued for reconciliation
of the divergent views for the sake of mutually strengthening the fields that
typically place the interests of ecosystems, species, and/or individuals within
the species at the forefront of moral agendas (e.g., Callicott, 1988; Kahn, 2010).
The point of conversion of these perspectives lies in a shared “love of nature”
or “biophilia,” as defined by Wilson (1984). The positions can be characterized
by the assumption that individual nonhuman entities (in animal rights) and even
ecosystems (in deep ecology) have value beyond their instrumental value (e.g.,
Kopnina, 2012b; Postma, 2002; Rolston, 1985). Even though conflicts can arise
between those who wish to protect the rights of individual animals and those
who wish to protect an ecosystem from an invasive species, the importance and
frequency of these conflicts often seems exaggerated in relation to the many
instances where a deepened understanding and appreciation of the intrinsic
value of nature and animals, regardless of one’s theoretical position, can be
used in support of building a more sustainable relationship between humans
and the rest of the planet. In education, such positions are often associated with
ecological justice (Bonnett, 2003, 2013; Kopnina, 2014a, 2014b; Payne, 2010).
Drawing on the work of Regan (1986), animal rights has been defined
as commitment to a number of goals, including the abolition of animal
experimentation, dissolution of commercial animal agriculture, and elimination
of commercial and sport hunting. In education, animal rights has often been taught
as part of broader courses associated with education for sustainability, including
variations on conservation, biology, and deep ecology courses (e.g., Drengson,
1991; Root-Bernstein, Root-Bernstein, & Root-Bernstein, 2014). In these courses,
animal ethics are often incorporated, generalizing non-anthropocentric views
of nature to species and individuals within a species. Animal rights are also
often associated with systematic criticism of the anthropocentric subordination
of non-human interests to the interests of humans, such as those visible in
intensive animal production systems (Wyckoff, 2014).
A number of educational programs that support the influence of animal eth-
ics have been developed by the Animal Welfare Institute, founded in 1951, and
The International Fund for Animal Welfare, founded in 1969, among other orga-
nizations. Both organizations are still involved in education for animal rights and
welfare. Teaching animal ethics as part of education for sustainability has been
established as educational practice, but is practiced ad hoc within and beyond
environmental education (e.g., Glasser, 2011; Gorski, 2009; Hickman, 2010).
110 Helen Kopnina & Mickey Gjerris
However, the objective of placing ecology and animal ethics at the centre
of education for sustainability has shifted toward education for sustainable
development (e.g., Wals, 2012). Over the past two decades, the market economy
has increasingly been represented as the solution to issues of sustainability and
conservation, embedding economic reasoning within environmental policy,
planning, and practice. Environmental management of “natural resources”
and “ecosystems services” has become interlinked with finance mechanisms
like “species banking,” “biodiversity derivatives,” and “carbon trading.” The
ubiquity of these constructs reflects a larger transformation in international
environmental politics, including efforts at climate change mitigation (Lidskog
& Elander, 2010). This governance has largely come to accommodate an
ontology of natural capital, commodifying nature as a natural resource or
ecosystem service, culminating in the production of the idea that nature can
be seen as merely a property among others. This trend, of presenting nature as
capital, has made its way into educational practices as well. Recognition of the
intrinsic value of biodiversity rarely appears in the environmental education/
education for sustainable development literature,2 with notable examples such
as this journal’s Volume 16 in 2011, entitled Animalty and Environmental
Education. Often, education for sustainable development literature is replete
with references to natural resources, natural capital, and ecosystem services,
conceptualizing nature through cost-benefit lens where it is simply seen as
raw material (Bonnett, 2013). The moral imperatives have shifted toward the
elevation of social equality, rather than addressing the limits to growth, in order
to continue to serve the global market through perpetuation of consumer culture
(Crist, 2012).
Education for sustainable development primarily promotes human (social
and economic) sustainability, placing its focus on a “sense of justice, responsibility,
exploration and dialogue,” as well as enabling “us all to live a full life without
being deprived of basic human needs” (Nevin, 2008, pp. 50-51). Translated into
teaching practice, acceptance of the primal importance of social and economic
sustainability is interlinked with conceptions of stewardship, management, and
“innovations” (Jickling & Wals, 2008). This “fixing” of the current predicament
through innovation is rarely related to ethical concerns about non-humans, and
says little about animal ethics. While ethical considerations about economic and
social equality dominate education for sustainable development, there is an
almost total absence of considerations regarding animal ethics; animal welfare
issues are often only included to the extent that current levels can be improved
or maintained while increasing production efficiency (Gjerris, 2014).
While educational research on teaching and learning about animal rights
and other aspects of animal ethics has advanced in veterinary training (Rollin,
2006), it has clearly not done so in connection with the broader framework of
environmental education. As previously noted, animal rights and speciesism
are rarely discussed in environmental education journals (Wyckoff, 2014).
Are Some Animals More Equal than Others? 111
Considering that there is no empirical evidence to prove that instrumental
attitudes to nature are sufficient for profoundly addressing issues of animal
welfare and rights, raising ethical objectives to anthropocentrism in education
seems well-warranted.
As mentioned, many theorists have attempted to demonstrate the precise
ways in which environmental ethics and animal ethics are entangled and
interdependent, as well as how they differ both in relation to each other and
in relation to specific positions within each field. It is not our objective to
summarize these arguments. Instead, we focus on the linkages among non-
consequentialism, animal rights, and deep ecology in educational contexts. We
will discuss the broader issue of ethics in education as a way to counteract
the anthropocentric assumptions that permeate education for sustainable
development and thus contribute to the current ecological crisis as described
by Naess (1973, 1993). According to Naess’s analysis, actions proceeding from
inclination may be politically more effective than those depending on a sense of
duty, and education could help by fostering love and respect for life. Finally, we
discuss how the inclusion of the perspectives of deep ecology and animal rights
would improve current environmental education programs by deepening the
respect for non-humans and their inclusion in the ethical community.
Pluralism, Animal Rights, and Deep Ecology
The field of environmental ethics offers an array of perspectives within which
animal ethics takes a more or less implicit position. Various positions within
environmental ethics can be positioned along the continuums of deep and
shallow ecology (Naess, 1973), strong and weak anthropocentrism (e.g., Norton,
1984), and pragmatic versus monistic ethics (Callicott, 1999; Light, 1996).
Pluralism3 has been proposed as the basis of environment education/edu-
cation for sustainable development to encourage active participation and open
views, rather than teaching consensus (Jickling, 1994; Jickling & Wals, 2008;
Öhman, 2006; Peters & Wals, 2013; Wals, 2012). These scholars propose an
education that reflects the diversity of sustainability perspectives, in order to
avoid reduction of education to a mere instrument for promoting a specific kind
of “sustainable” behavior (Wals, 2012; Wals & Jickling, 2002).
This turn to a more relativistic and reflective education can be seen as a
reaction to what educators fear to be authoritarian tendencies of top-down
curriculum. To be fair, pluralism can be approached from many different
ideological standpoints, including liberalism, pragmatism, and deliberative
democracy. It is the particular kind of pluralism embracing market economy,
rather than pluralism as an educational approach to democratic communication
in schools, that we will focus on here. This type of pluralism stands in sharp
contrast to education for sustainability with its need to address urgent problems
(e.g., Kopnina, 2012a).
112 Helen Kopnina & Mickey Gjerris
When talking about “the pluralistic perspective,” we primarily speak of it in
the specific context of dominant approaches. This opens up an understanding of
pluralism that does not represent variations on only one dominant (neoliberal,
anthropocentric) approach—but still enables the critique of the positions that
the dominant discourse espouses. Our claim is that it is this narrow notion of
pluralism that has led to the reduction and even disappearance of rights related
to the non-human world in current environmental education/education for sus-
tainable development practices.
Deep Ecology and Animal Rights in Environmental Ethics
A school of thinkers labeling themselves as pragmatists have argued that the
intrinsic value discourse of nature has little practical value (Light, 1996; Norton,
1995) and that moral anthropocentrism is unavoidable (Hui, 2014). The
consequentialists support the idea that ethics is relative and that animal rights
are the result of cultural and historical preferences, rather than a moral absolute.
However, the generalized consequentialist school of thinkers is often much less
inclined to express their fear of indoctrination in relation to teaching against
racism, sexism, or any form of human discrimination.
The second school of critics shares the first school’s assessment of sustainable
development objectives as contradictory, and is equally critical of neoliberalism.
However, the consequentialist school does not abandon all instrumentalism in
education, but only the type that leads students to accept current mainstream
neoliberalism. Pluralism disguises neoliberalism, masking the dominant
neoliberal ideologies under the guise of free choice (Davies & Bansel, 2007).
Just relying on pluralism in environmental education/education for sustainable
development fails to address anthropocentric bias present in neoliberal
educational practices (Kopnina, 2012a, 2014b). Instead of celebrating a diversity
of approaches, critical scholars have therefore proposed a re-orientation of
environmental education/education for sustainable development’s focus toward
environmental sustainability, placing environmental degradation as the root
cause of unsustainability. Deep ecology, as understood here, emphasizes the
unity of biotic community—including humans—and respect for its integrity of
a “whole” as a moral obligation (Naess, 1973), and supports intrinsic value of
nature (e.g., McCauley, 2006).
The two schools of thought introduced above agree that sustainability is
subject to social and political influences with contradictions in purpose. For
example, achieving low mortality (resulting in population growth), economic
prosperity (resulting in greater pressures on resources), and ecological
sustainability may be all but impossible (Rolston, 2015). Critics have pointed
out that while on the surface, unprecedented concerns with human welfare
everywhere are laudable, the implicit model of “social equity” will require
continued sacrifices of biodiversity (e.g., Crist, 2012).
Are Some Animals More Equal than Others? 113
Consideration of non-human species is marginal in the perspectives
dominated by social and economic agendas. While ethical injunctions of
sustainable development condemn practices like gender, class, and ethnic and
racial discrimination, they rarely address ecological injustice or violations of
animal rights. The clearing of pristine areas for agricultural development or
industrial activities, or the daily mechanized slaughter of farm animals, is rarely
discussed as a nexus of sustainability and ethics (e.g., Crist, 2012; Shepard,
1993), although there are attempts to formulate sustainable ways of animal
production that include both environmental and animal concerns (e.g., Gjerris,
Gamborg, Röcklinsberg, & Anthony, 2011).
The largest objection to the anthropocentric view of nature is that it does
not guarantee protection to habitats, species, or individual animals that are
functionally “useless.” Contrary to the claim that anthropocentric and ecocentric
approaches will be able to achieve the same aims (e.g., Norton, 1995) this
convergence thesis is empirically questionable. Thompson (2010) asks how
biodiversity loss will affect the human race. Will we even notice? Thompson’s
answer to the question of whether we need to preserve certain iconic species
such as pandas is a resounding no—we do not need to save every species, as
humanity is not dependent on them for the ecosystems to provide the services
needed to uphold our existence. This makes a portion of biological diversity
expendable, because no negative side effects for people ensue when certain
species are gone, making the very existence of some species redundant (Cafaro
& Primack, 2014). The psychological and existential loss we might experience
from wiping out species that are not necessary for our survival is, however, quite
another matter (Abram, 1996, 2011).
Not all species are important for human survival as the history of extinc-
tions proves that humans can very well depend on agricultural monocultures.
Rolston (1985), Cafaro and Primack (2014), and Crist and Kopnina (2014) argue
that it is our moral responsibility to preserve all species—it is not just something
we are required to do if it is in narrow self-interest. Since humans, unlike other
predators or viruses, are consciously aware of the consequences of their actions,
it is our moral obligation to protect those species that we—as a collective—have
driven to extinction.
As mentioned, we here leave aside all of the differences between animal
rights and deep ecology in our attempt to focus on the alternative to anthropo-
centrism. Our suggestion is that both deep ecologists and individuals concerned
about animals, and the lack of respect and care for them, can meet in mutual
recognition of at least some ecocentric values and appreciate and respect non-
human species and the natural world for their inherent ethical importance.
Notwithstanding the differences in perspectives outlined in the section
above, the largest gap is between those who see all of nature as instrumental to
human needs, and those that see individual animals, entire species, and/or whole
ecosystems as deserving of our moral attention and protection. Much of what
passes for environmentalism, at least in the practical sense, is anthropocentric,
114 Helen Kopnina & Mickey Gjerris
condemning animals to be subservient to human interests, a position that most
deep ecology and animal rights proponents would reject. Generally, both deep
ecology and animal rights proponents will be concerned about animals used for
medical experimentation, or the animals that are extinct, such as the Thylacine
(commonly known as Tasmanian tiger), Passenger Pigeon, and the Golden Toad.
At the core of the concern regarding a narrow pluralistic approach is the
realization that there is nothing about democracy that guarantees decisions fa-
vouring sustainability (Lidskog & Elander, 2010). If pluralism does not guarantee
environmentally benign outcomes, where does it leave education for sustain-
ability? “Anything goes” pluralism easily turns into relativism and renders the
deep ecology perspective as—at best—one of many perspectives (Wals, 2010).
Raising an issue of extinction of an entire species or animal subordination
in such a context becomes nothing more than a marginal position (Wyckoff,
2014). Yet, from our perspective, there are no cogent grounds for assuming that
humans are “better” than or superior to other animals and living things. The
dominant ideologies of neoliberal industrial capitalism seem to have succeeded
in propagating the illusion that humans are superior to other species, a conse-
quence “logical” from the contextual perspective of capitalism, and because the
claim is taken to be universal. Thus, the robust anthropocentric bias excludes
any serious consideration of non-human species that is at the core of deep ecol-
ogy and animal rights perspectives (Kopnina, 2012a). It is the acknowledgement
of the anthropocentric bias that is needed to move beyond conventions.
Alternative Directions
Currently, perspectives such as deep ecology or animal rights are not central in
environmental education, as there is place for any kind of perspective within
educational practice. From the pluralistic perspective, deep ecology could be
central to environmental education/education for sustainable development, but
this possibility is fully contingent upon socio-political and cultural context. This
then, obviously, does not guarantee that deep ecology or animal rights perspec-
tives will be given priority or will not be substituted by yet another dominant
perspective.
An argument for ensuring that the perspectives of animal rights and deep
ecology are given a more prominent position has been put forth by Dobson
(2003). He has suggested that future generations and non-human animals could
be democratically represented through proxy representatives elected explicitly
to promote the interests of non-humans, occurring through real elections. In
his later work, Dobson (2014) argues that the overwhelming attention paid to
speech rather than listening in politics is a direct result of defining the political
being in terms of the capacity to speak. Since animals cannot speak themselves,
the ability to recognize their “voice,” or that of their representatives, is of crucial
importance if non-humans are to be included in democratic and moral spheres
Are Some Animals More Equal than Others? 115
of influence, something that bioregionalists have discussed (Lockyer, 2013).
This implies that representation of non-humans could be positively reinforced
through educational efforts and through de-politicizing education (Sund &
Öhman, 2014), the way education has helped to forward inclusion of other social
minorities or discriminated groups into the moral sphere implicit or explicit in
the established curriculum.
Others have argued that if the objective is recognizing that animals are be-
ings with inherent value and due to this their fundamental interests ought to
be protected, then one should speak of fundamental rights, rather than demo-
cratic rights (Mataresse, 2010). The core of Naess’ approach is that sustainability
hinges on developing consistent views, policies, actions, and indeed education
curricula that are tied back to a well-informed understanding of the state of the
planet. According to Glasser’s (2011) analysis, deep ecology helps shine a bright-
er light on the gap between our attitudes and our generally unsustainable ac-
tions and policies. Education could help by fostering love and respect for life, as
Naess wrote, and result in wider benefits of a sustainable future for both human
and non-human inhabitants of this planet. This is the type of non-consequential
approach to moral goods, such as sustainability or animal rights, that could be
integrated into environmental education and education for sustainable develop-
ment to create substantial change from the bottom up.
The non-consequentialist approach suggests that there are valid arguments
for including non-human entities and systems within the moral sphere—and
from that point of view, deep ecology should indeed be central to environmental
education/education for sustainable development. Combining this top-down ap-
proach to ethics with a more experience-oriented ethics of nature, as found in
Glendining (1994) or Griffiths (2006), would enable a kind of moral “progress”
that more relativistic positions do not have. While at present we have not (yet)
recognized that deep ecology is at the core of our moral obligations, rekindling
ideas of responsibility and duty beyond anthropocentric conventions might of-
fer a productive way of “moving forward” to the moral summit in which ecocen-
tric values are recognized and progressively achieved. Cultural relativism and
pluralism may be too weak to overcome the dominant hegemony.
Returning to the question of pluralism in environmental education, the
development of critical thinking and free will of students and citizens is indeed
essential for learning about the significance of the animal rights and deep ecology
perspectives. However, while some scholars have argued that pluralism does not
equal relativism and indifference (Jickling 1994; Wals & Jickling, 2002; Wals
2012), they have not addressed the issue of actual representation of animals and
nature in educational practice. According to the “Linked Oppressions Thesis”
(Wyckoff, 2014), this would require equal intellectual and moral commitment as
the integration of presently “mainstream” moral issues such as social equality.
We would like to support Bonnett’s (2013) call to develop an appreciation
of places that constitute our life-worlds as the “source of meaning, intrinsic
116 Helen Kopnina & Mickey Gjerris
value and identity,” in order to critically approach the “unrestrained play of
anthropocentrism and the metaphysics of mastery” (p. 269).
Thus, environmental education/education for sustainable development
could provide an alternative learning toward recognizing the beauty and mys-
tery of nature. Earnest recognition of the value of outdoor education (Sandell
& Öhman, 2010), deep ecology education (e.g., LaChapelle, 1991), and post-
humanist education (Bonnett, 2003) may lead to integration of human interests
with those of the entire ecosphere.
Reflection
Deep ecology’s philosophy of inclusion is often based on (broadly speaking)
phenomenological arguments, including an openness to experiencing animals
and nature as more than resources for human needs. Often, these experiences
seem to “gentle” in the face of dominant neoliberal ideology, fuelled by econom-
ic interests. On the other hand, animal rights arguments are perhaps potentially
“too strong,” too far removed from the mainstream dominant morality. Animal
rights activists such as such as Animal Liberation Front (ALF) have been branded
radicals and terrorists (Liddick, 2006). In analyzing the influence of (radical) en-
vironmentalism on the development of critical eco-pedagogical studies, and the
work of Marcuse, Kahn (2010) reflects:
To my mind, Marcuse is one of the preeminent philosophers of education in mod-
ern times…because his educational theory was essentially linked to the ecological
problem of human and nonhuman relations due to his understanding that education
is a cultural activity, and that in Western history such culture has systematically
defined itself against nature in both a hierarchically dominating and repressive man-
ner. (p. 138)
Kahn (2010) explores these radical ideas as one of the means to move edu-
cation beyond the “anything goes” relativism (Wals, 2010) and toward a more
engaged and compassionate—in fact, a revolutionary—involvement with the
ecological crises (Kopnina, 2014a).
Practically speaking, considering the needs of non-human species and
indeed, ecosystems as a whole, requires more fully elaborated institutional
solutions as well as educational approaches. If there are no institutional
guarantees that other species will be considered in decision-making processes,
their interests will be constantly neglected (Eckersley, 2004). We therefore argue
that “pluralistic learning” can also be understood as a form of indoctrination.
First, every education for something is a form of indoctrination, as in the case of
mainstream neoliberal doctrines propagated by sustainable development (e.g.,
Jickling, 1994). Indoctrination that hides its instrumental aims under the guise of
“pluralism” simultaneously tends to marginalize or radicalize alternative visions,
and de-moralize perspectives such as deep ecology or animal rights.
Are Some Animals More Equal than Others? 117
Perhaps, denial of the fact that there are objective problems associated with
unsustainability leaves pluralistic approaches to environmental education and
education for sustainable development counterproductive to the aim of sustain-
ability. In this context, pluralism submerges essential moral questions within
ethically convoluted discourse, without acknowledgement of its own anthropo-
centric bias. Democratic, pluralistic, and open approaches to education assume
that the students are able to choose among multiple options, and be taught to
be “‘rational, self-managing, self-promoting agents’ [who are] able to ‘make
informed choices and manifest endless possibilities’, assuming that all subjects
are equally positioned to recognize, mobilize and consolidate productive or suc-
cessful choices” (Bansel, 2007, p. 298). Yet, essentially, such assumptions leave
economically-centered, anthropocentric hegemony intact, marginalizing or rad-
icalizing alternatives and preventing the staff—and students—from distinguish-
ing between more or less viable, realistic, and effective kinds of sustainability
knowledge and skills.
In discussing environmental justice (equal distribution of environmental
risks and benefits, including to non-human species) and democracy, Dobson
(2003) emphasizes that “if harm is being done, then more justice rather than
more talking is the first requirement” (p. 26). This requirement should be reflect-
ed in education. One way of doing that is giving the speechless voice. To do that,
however, it is not enough just to speak on their behalf, but also to learn how to
hear what they have to say. And to that it is necessary to take the time to experi-
ence what it is the world has to say to us. Here we rely on the Danish theologian
Løgstrup (1995) and his thoughts about how human knowledge about the world
is the result of a silent “dialogue” between the human pre-understanding of the
world and how the world presents itself to us. In this it is implied that there is
a possibility to experience more than our own needs when experiencing the
world (e.g., before the cow becomes a biological reactor producing milk, it is an
independent animal that has an ethical importance of its own) (Løgstrup, 1995).
So, to answer the question, “What will change, if we take animal rights and deep
ecology seriously?,” we need to listen first to the many speechless voices of the
world—and then speak up for them.
Because other species cannot engage in “pluralistic” discussion due to their
inability to speak our language, the participation of deep ecology educators is
not only essential in sustainability debates, but it is also time for them to pass
on the ability to listen to the voices that are speaking in a more-than-human lan-
guage in environmental education and education for sustainable development.
In true pluralism, human eco-advocates who “speak for nature” (O’Neill, 2006)
will represent the voices of the billions of Earth’s citizens who are absent from
one-species-only pluralism. As Regan (1986) has stated:
People must change their beliefs before they change their habits. Enough people, es-
pecially those elected to public office, must believe in change—must want it—before
we will have laws that protect the rights of animals. This process of change is very
118 Helen Kopnina & Mickey Gjerris
complicated, very demanding, very exhausting, calling for the efforts of many hands
in education, publicity, political organization and activity. (p. 180)
This type of change will require not the proliferation of increasingly complex aca-
demic debates, but affirmative action programs on behalf of what is left of nature.
Conclusion
We have suggested here that mainstream environmental education/education
for sustainable development seems to have internalized the neoliberal agenda
and, as a result, has become too anthropocentric in its understanding and evalu-
ation of nature to undercut the dominance of a neoliberally sanctioned pluralism
that is, on the one hand, too narrow (only allowing critique of a specific kind)
and, on the other, so open as to become too relativistic to undermine the exist-
ing power hegemonies. In order to counteract the current notion of pluralism
which has led to the reduction and even disappearance of any issues (rights or
otherwise) related to the non-human world in environmental education/educa-
tion for sustainable development, we need to ask: why is discrimination against
women, ethnic minorities, and LGBTQ individuals4 wrong (at least in our “en-
lightened” western society), but the treatment of animals in the industrial food
production system left to individual consumer preferences? Most teachers will
be fired for instigating any kind of socially discriminating statements, yet it is
“acceptable” to treat extinction as one of the many possible ways of looking at
the challenges of sustainability.
The dominant stream of education for sustainable development literature
emphasizes an instrumental view of nature that supports the current unsustain-
able development. In this situation conservation education, education for deep
ecology, and education supporting the recognition of animal rights offer ways
forward. Here we have outlined an alternative approach with explicit empha-
sis on the inclusion of animal rights and deep ecology, not as “one of many”
perspectives, but as a privileged position that, together with respect and care
for individual animals (animal rights in a broad sense), can form the basis of a
sustainable environmental education.
A truly pluralistic approach would allow all Earth’s citizens, including
non-human species, to voice their opinion as to what needs to be sustained.
Obviously, animals and plants cannot speak human language, thus they should
be represented through human advocates. This alternative would entail a critical
education exposing the deficiencies of mainstream morality of sustainable
development. In education, this implies affirmative action programs that seek
to sustain and protect not only human interests, but the whole of the more-
than-human-lifeworld—sustained in a sense that recognizes that unlike ethnic
minorities, women, LGBTQ individuals, or slaves, these co-inhabitants will never
be able to speak for themselves, even when threatened with extinction.
Are Some Animals More Equal than Others? 119
Notes
1 In this article, animal rights is sometimes referred to as a distinct position and
sometimes used in the context of speaking about reflections on ethics of animals,
so we also speak more generally of “care for animals” and “animal ethics.”
2 See, for example, articles in The Journal of Environmental Education, Environmen-
tal Education Research, and the Journal of Education for Sustainable Development.
3 Pluralism is a very broad term and we do not wish here to exclude any kind of
pluralistic approach to teaching environmental education. What we argue is that
the “narrrow” pluralistic approach presented here is not sufficient in the present
situation, and should be replaced with another, more non-antropocentric norma-
tive basis for teaching.
4 The abbreviation LGBTQ stands for individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bise-
xual, transgender, and/or queer.
Notes on Contributors
Dr. Helen Kopnina is currently employed at Leiden University and at The
Hague University of Applied Science (HHS) in The Netherlands. At Leiden, she
lectures in anthropology and development and environmental anthropology at
the Leiden Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology. At
HHS, she is a coordinator and lecturer of the Sustainable Business program and
a researcher in the fields of environmental education and environmental social
sciences. She is the author of over 40 peer-reviewed articles, and (co)author and
(co)editor of 10 books. Contact: h.kopnina@hhs.nl; alenka1973@yahoo.com
Dr. Mickey Gjerris holds a Master of Theology and a PhD in Bioethics. He
works as an associate professor in bioethics at the Department for Food and
Resource Economics at the University of Copenhagen. His main research
areas are bioethics, ethics of nature, and animal ethics. He is also member
of The Danish Council of Ethics, an advisory body to the Danish Parliament.
Contact: mickeygjerris@gmail.com
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