cognition is body-based (Wilson, M, 2002: 625).
She argues that some of these claims "are more controversial than
others" (Wilson, M, 2002: 625) and cautions against over extending the
application of the theory: Wilson's critique is comprehensive and includes
all the key challenges to this stance. While the sixth claim, that "off-line
cognition is body-based", "may in fact be the best documented and most
powerful" (Wilson, M., 2002: 625), she argues that the remainder are, at
best, "at least partially true" (Wilson, M., 2002: 625).
Her criticism of the first claim, that "cognition is situated" (Wilson, M.,
2002: 625), does not impact on my application of the theory. She notes
that "large portions of human cognitive processing" cannot be situated,
and Kirsh and Anderson concur (Anderson, 2003: 116; Kirsh, 1991: 171).
Specifically, these are off-line cognitive processes that involve "our ability
to form mental representations about things that are remote in time and
space" (Wilson, M., 2002: 626). However, I concluded at the end of the
previous sub-section that Eco-Pagan practice primarily uses on-line
cognition, so it is not subject to this critique.
I concur with Wilson that the second claim - that cognition is time-
pressured - is too broad, as many of our daily activities "do not inherently
involve time pressure" (Wilson, M., 2002: 628). However, this claim is not
required or implied by the enactivist process model. Wilson supports the
third claim, that "we off-load cognitive work onto the environment"
(Wilson, M., 2002: 625), as long as we recognize that it is only applicable
to on-line cognition (Wilson, M., 2002: 629), which is exactly how I apply
the theory.
Wilson mounts a fairly robust attack on the fourth claim that "the
environment is part of the cognitive system" (Wilson, M., 2002: 625),
which, given the centrality of this claim to my approach, I need to discuss.
Wilson’s critique hinges on what we mean by "cognitive system". On this
basis she concludes that what she call the "strong version" of extended
cognition, "that a cognitive system cannot in principle be taken to
comprise only an individual mind", will not hold (Wilson, M., 2002: 631).
There are two types of cognitive system: "Facultative systems are
temporary, organized for a particular occasion and disbanded readily",
while "obligate systems ... are more or less permanent, at least relative to
the lifetime of their parts" (Wilson, M., 2002: 630). Because I am
explicitly concerned with embodied situated cognition in quite distinct
locations, I work with a model that uses facultative rather than obligate
systems. Wilson accepts this "weaker version", which she concludes offers
"a promising ... avenue of investigation" (Wilson, M., 2002: 631).
Wilson critique of the fifth claim, that cognition is for action, once again
focus on limitations rather than general validity. Although this claim is
supported by much of the available evidence, it doesn't apply in all
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