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Well-being for a better world: the contribution
of a radically relational and nature-inclusive
conception of well-being to the sustainability
transformation
Tuula Helne
To cite this article: Tuula Helne (2021) Well-being for a better world: the contribution of a radically
relational and nature-inclusive conception of well-being to the sustainability transformation,
Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy, 17:1, 220-230, DOI: 10.1080/15487733.2021.1930716
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SUSTAINABILITY: SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY
2021, VOL. 17, NO. 1, 220–230
https://doi.org/10.1080/15487733.2021.1930716
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Well-being for a better world: the contribution of a radically relational
and nature-inclusive conception of well-being to the sustainability
transformation
Tuula Helne
Kela (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland), Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
The current ecological crisis attests that the price of the human pursuit of well-being has
been too high and that the conception of well-being behind this pursuit has been flawed.
Building on research on sustainable well-being, well-being research in sociology, social pol-
icy, psychology, and philosophy; need theories, degrowth research, and ecopsychology, this
article investigates what kind of narrative and conception of well-being could contribute to
the transformation toward sustainability. The article first delves into the current popularity of
the discourse on well-being, discussing both its pitfalls and promises, and explaining why
well-being is a significant concept for the sustainability transformation, when appropriately
defined and free of an economic bias. A relational, and therefore sustainable, approach to
well-being, namely the Having-Loving-Doing-Being framework (shortened HDLB), is then pre-
sented and elaborated. Going deeper into the topic of relationality, the article then examines
the tug-of-war between the notions of objective vs. subjective and hedonic vs. eudaimonic
well-being, and clarifies the HDLB framework’s position on these issues, elucidating why a
radically relational and nature-inclusive – and in the last resort, non-dualist – approach,
offers an exit from the polarity of these dichotomies.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 21 January 2021
Accepted 11 May 2021
KEYWORDS
Sustainable well-being;
eudaimonia; hedonism;
needs; relationality; nature-
inclusiveness
Introduction
Human societies are guided by stories people tell
one another. The narrative that has brought us to
the present situation is that of progress made pos-
sible by economic growth and advances in technol-
ogy. According to this tale, humanity is steadily
moving toward a brighter future. When it comes to
material prosperity, particularly in certain parts of
the world, this is not a mere fairytale. However, in
many other aspects, the story has lost its credibility,
as the price of the so-called progress has proven to
be far too high. According to the Intergovernmental
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (IPBES 2019, 11–12), the rate of
global change in nature during the past fifty years is
unprecedented in human history, with around one
million animal and plant species at risk of extinc-
tion. There is growing and uncontestable evidence
that economic growth is harmful to our planet (e.g.,
Jackson 2009). The so-called Great Acceleration
graphs show that since 1750, the steeply rising
curves of concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, ocean acidification, tropical forest loss,
and so forth have followed the curve of growth of
gross domestic product (GDP) (Steffen et al. 2015).
Despite the growing alarm, such as the global cli-
mate and environmental emergency declared by the
European Parliament (2019), appropriate and pro-
portionate measures are nowhere to be seen, and
the grim statement of leading scientists (Ehrlich et
al. 2012) that “humanity has never been moving
faster nor further from sustainability than it is
now,” is more burning than ever. Neither have our
social nor personal problems been solved: inequality
and violence are rampant, extreme poverty has not
been eradicated, mental stress and anxiety are com-
monly shared predicaments, and the list goes on.
The current economic order has pithily been
described as “unfair, unsustainable, unstable, and
unhappy” (Trebeck 2019). This situation sets in
motion a vicious circle because unhappy people can-
not create a happy society, and an unhappy society
cannot beget optimal conditions for fostering bal-
anced individuals.
How can this be possible? After all, all humans
wanted was the good life. This being the case, there
must be something inherently rotten in the way the
good life is conceived.
CONTACT Tuula Helne tuula.helne@kela.fi Kela (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland), Messeniuksenkatu 1, 00101 Helsinki, Finland
This article was originally published with errors, which have now been corrected in the online version. Please see Correction (http://dx.doi.org/10.
1080/15487733.2021.2016103)
ß 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
SUSTAINABILITY: SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY
221
In this article, I investigate the narratives and
conceptions of the good life – in other words, well--
being – and how they could be improved to achieve
ecological sustainability and sustainable well-being
for all the denizens of Earth. In doing so, I share
the view of IPBES (2019, 17) that transformations
toward sustainability are more likely when efforts
are directed at certain key leverage points where
efforts yield exceptionally large effects. “Visions of a
good life that do not entail ever-increasing material
consumption” is the first point IPBES raises.
I begin my argumentation by delving into the cur-
rent popularity of the discourse on well-being,
explaining in the next section why well-being is a sig-
nificant concept for the sustainability transformation
when appropriately defined.1 In the third section, I
present a relational, and therefore sustainable,
approach to well-being, namely the Having-Loving-
Doing-Being framework (shortened HLDB). In the
fourth section, I examine the tug-of-war between the
notions of objective vs. subjective and hedonic vs.
eudaimonic well-being, clarify the HDLB frame-
work’s position on these issues, elucidating why a
relational – and in the last resort, non-dualist –
approach offers an exit from the polarity of these
dichotomies. The article closes with a reflection on
the importance of a nature-inclusive (that is, radically
relational) conception of well-being. The argumenta-
tion builds on research on sustainable well-being;
well-being research in sociology, social policy, psych-
ology, and philosophy; need theories, degrowth
research, and ecopsychology.
The increasing popularity of the discourse
on well-being: faltering steps and promises
The concept of well-being enjoys ever-growing popu-
larity in academia as well as in wider society. There
has been an “extraordinary explosion of references”
to well-being (White 2017, 121), so that now the
word can be spotted “everywhere: in exhortations for
individual action, in marketing goods and services,”
and “in a repositioning of the goals of government
and policy intervention” (Atkinson 2013, 137). While
many institutions have acknowledged the need to
“broaden the public and policy discourse”
(H€am€al€ainen and Michaelson 2014), there is, how-
ever, a reason to doubt the weight accorded to well-
being in public and economic policy.
For decades, GDP growth has been the central
aim of most societies, an indicator of progress as
well as well-being, despite the fact that already
Simon Kuznets, credited as the inventor of GDP,
cautioned against equating this measure in such
terms (Costanza et al. 2014). Despite mounting criti-
cism of this kind of use (e.g., Stiglitz et al. 2009),
and recognition that besides economic growth, there
are other aims for public policy, we are still far
from a situation in which governments and inter-
governmental organizations would unambiguously
declare well-being as their main priority.
This is evident, for example, in the OECD’s dis-
course on “the economy of well-being,” in which
the priority order is stated in no uncertain terms:
“investing in people’s well-being sets the founda-
tions for stronger and more sustainable economic
growth” (Llena Nozal, Martin, and Murtin 2019, 9).
The same preference can also be detected in the
program of the Finnish government (2019, 152):
“We have not invested in the well-being and inclu-
sion of people solely because we have had the finan-
cial resources to do so; instead, we have also wanted
to become a prosperous nation.” In the statement
well-being is not described as an end itself, but as a
means to something else: the wealth of a nation.
However, the level of material prosperity nations
reach today does not guarantee the well-being of
future generations. On the contrary, it may endan-
ger it. It is also questionable how economic defini-
tions in which well-being may mean “people
working and paying taxes” (Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health 2019) harmonize with people’s
subjective definitions.
Let us, for the moment, skip over this somewhat
tepid commitment to well-being as well as the dif-
ferent or conflicting interpretations of the notion,
and ask why it is a useful concept containing many
promises particularly for the sustainability
transformation.
First, the word well-being is positively charged.
Who would not want to attain “a good or satisfac-
tory condition of existence; a state characterized by
health, happiness, and prosperity”?2 Moreover, this
positivity includes both the individual and social
levels, since well-being can be understood either as
a beneficent personal experience or, more widely, as
“a positive and sustainable state that allows individ-
uals, groups or nations to thrive and flourish”
(Huppert et al. 2004, 1331). Well-being is also an
inclusive concept, relevant for everyone regardless of
social position; a notion that unites rather than
divides (White 2010, 159). It is also, as I show later,
a concept that can transcend the anthropocentric
bias that hallmarks the dominant worldview, appo-
sitely designated “human exemptionalism” (Catton
and Dunlap 1980).
Second, the notion of well-being is holistic. On a
personal level, it connects the mental and the phys-
ical as well as the immaterial and the material sides
of existence. It can (or should) therefore repudiate
the compartmentalization of people’s lives according
222
T. HELNE
to professional specialization or sectoral divisions
(White 2010, 159).
Third, the word well-being directs attention to
people’s own experiences, moving beyond external
and “objective” macro-level measures of well-being
(White, 2010, 160) – or rather, indicators considered
to be descriptive of well-being. Well-being is inevit-
ably a subjective experience. This is why external
indicators such as longevity, education, or standard
of living do not tell very much about people’s well-
being. One might even claim that there is no such
thing as objective well-being. Perhaps this is why a
number of researchers find it difficult to write about
“objective” well-being without quotation marks
(White 2016, 28). They (as well as I) hold that to
complement “economists’ abstractions” (Gasper
2004, 30), it is vital to learn about people’s own
experiences and to focus on “the personal,” “the sig-
nature emphasis of well-being” (White 2017, 131).
Fourth, well-being is tied to motivation and aspi-
rations. In the Macmillan dictionary, well-being is
defined as “the satisfactory state that someone or
something should be in.” Well-being is something
people or societies aspire to, and achieving well-
being may even be the strongest source of motiv-
ation for human action. Well-being is, then, not
only an outcome of something but also a force of
action and change, both on the personal and the
social level.
It has been suggested that the widespread talk
about well-being is an indication of shared anxiety
that our well-being is actually jeopardized (see
White 2017). I interpret this anxiety as a sign of a
deepening sense of crisis of the whole consumerist
way of life and a growing and gnawing awareness of
its ecological repercussions. The concept of well-
being gives hope for a better future. For some, it
may also entail an urge to replace the political
agenda for economic growth with an agenda for
well-being “for people and the planet,” an expres-
sion increasingly found in publications across differ-
ent disciplines and fields of life (e.g., Boyce 2019;
Burch 2011; Merry 2019). The “will for well-being”
could therefore be a catalyst for transformation.
Ideally, it could help to steer “away from the cur-
rently limited paradigm of economic growth”
(IPBES 2019, 33), and pave the way for seeking
alternatives to the current, unsustainable social
order. This was demonstrated, for instance, by the
call of 238 academics on the European Union for a
post-growth future in which human and ecological
well-being takes priority over GDP (The
Guardian 2018).
We do not, however, live in an ideal world. As
Sarah White (2010, 168) writes, “there is no doubt
that there is amongst those advocating well-being a
lot of energy for change and especially to question
the supreme value of economic growth. But for
many, perhaps most of these, there is also a good
measure of ‘business as usual’.” While the word
well-being may be spotted anywhere, the same goes
for economic discourse, with the latter often lurking
behind the former. A Web of Science search for
well-being and climate change publications
(1900–2016) showed that only 848 studies referred
to well-being in the context of climate change, in
comparison to 6803 for income, and that a mere
100 studies referred to it in the context of climate-
change mitigation, compared to 1306 for income
(Lamb and Steinberger 2017). This is a serious
omission and in line with the observation that cur-
rent well-being approaches inadequately account for
interdependencies and may even reinforce alienation
and the exploitation of nature (Kjell 2011, 13).
What kind of well-being approach would be more
suitable, then? I argue that the keyword is
relationality.
A framework of relational well-being: the
Having-Doing-Loving-Being approach
In order to deliver on its promises and to serve the
sustainability transformation, the discourse on well-
being should be decoupled from economic growth
and overly materialistic considerations. Well-being
should, instead, be coupled with nature and be
defined holistically. This could be done through the
Having-Doing-Loving-Being framework (shortened
HDLB) (e.g., Helne and Hirvilammi 2015, 2017,
2019): a relational, inclusive, needs-based, and
multi-dimensional conception of well-being, in
which well-being is perceived as fundamentally
dependent on planetary ecosystems. Below, I present
the approach concisely with some elaborations.
The HDLB framework comprises four dimen-
sions of well-being, that is, four categories of needs:
Having, Doing, Loving, and Being. The development
of this framework was inspired by Erik Allardt’s
(1976, 1990, 1993) Having-Loving-Being theory of
well-being.3 However, unlike in his formulation, in
the HDLB framework, the dimensions of well-being
are embedded in their ecosystemic foundation.4 This
makes the approach relational not only in a social
but also in an ecological sense. This is also what dif-
ferentiates the approach from many, if not most,
ways of defining well-being, and forms perhaps its
most noteworthy contribution. Due to its ecosyste-
mic grounding, the approach can also be character-
ized as radically relational, in the sense that it
means (re)rooting human well-being in nature
(radix, latin ¼ roots). In the last resort, however, the
SUSTAINABILITY: SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY
223
approach is non-dualist (see Helne 2019), as
humans are inseparable from nature.
The ecosystemic embeddedness of well-being
means that the dimension of Having – the need for
subsistence – is firmly anchored in the material
resources provided by ecosystems. The word
“having” may sound misplaced in the context of the
critique of unsustainable consumerist capitalism, but
it refers to what Erich Fromm called “existential
having.” With it, he referred to the requirement to
“have, keep, take care of, and use certain things in
order to survive,” stressing that existential having
has to be distinguished from “characterological
having,” or (to use a perhaps less ambiguous term),
excessive having. This, in turn, refers to a socially
determined “passionate drive to retain and keep”
(Fromm [1976], 1997, 69–70) The urge to excessive
having is thus a corollary of the capitalist economy.
In the HDLB framework, Having is also understood
in an Aristotelian sense. Aristotle pointed out that
human well-being requires that we are “sufficiently
[emphasis added] equipped with external goods.”
He was strongly against excess, insisting that “we
can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea; for
even with moderate advantages can one act virtu-
ously.” (Aristotle [384–322] 2016, 23, 169).
Doing denotes meaningful activities that allow
individuals to abide by their values. It has been
argued that human beings have an inherent sense of
morality and “a sense of sustainability” (Holden et
al. 2018). From this perspective, caring for nature is
an essential component of human well-being (Jax et
al. 2018). Under the right circumstances, the deeply
felt need to protect life may lead to an endeavor to
be engaged in ethically and ecologically responsible
activities. Returning to Aristotle ([384–322] 2016,
166), eudaimonia is “activity [emphasis added] in
accordance with virtue.” In the growth economies,
however, it is not evident that the need to act in
sustainable ways is endorsed.
Again, on account of the ecosystemic embedded-
ness of the HDLB approach, the conception of
Loving differs from the most common ways of
defining relationships pertinent to well-being by
including relations not only with other humans but
also with non-human animals and nature. Loving is,
by definition, relational, and reaches out both into
the past and into the future to include our parents
and ancestors as well as our children and their chil-
dren. Loving also encompasses geographical space:
one can love one’s back garden, the nearby forest,
the African savannah, or the entire planet. When
the dimension of Loving is comprehended in this
wide sense, well-being can no longer be criticized
for being an anthropocentric notion. It consequently
redeems its promise of being a unifying and holis-
tic concept.
Finally, the dimension of Being includes physical
and mental health and what could be called being
fully human. In its latter meaning, Being is an
experience of aliveness, authentic relatedness to the
world, inner activity, presence, imaginativeness, self-
actualization, growth, and freedom to be oneself
(Fromm [1976], 1997, 21, 71–72, 139–140.) Being
also includes spirituality and inner transformation.
These, as the whole dimension of Being, deserve far
more attention in well-being research, not least
because they are crucial and deep leverage points
for the sustainability transformation (e.g., Helne
2019; Woiwode et al. 2021).
Even though the HDLB framework contains four
dimensions, in practice they are interconnected and
overlapping. A person who, for instance, has found
work that not only puts food on the table but that
she finds meaningful and beneficial to other beings’
well-being, is simultaneously actualizing the needs
of Having, Doing, Loving, and Being. The dimen-
sions thus portray the totality required for well-
being, which means that well-being is actualized
when all four needs are sufficiently fulfilled. It is
also extremely important that their relationship is
balanced (Sirgy and Wu 2009), because until now
well-being has, to too large an extent, been identi-
fied with Having À and even with excessive having.
The consequences for the Earth system and our psy-
ches have been disastrous: the obsession of having,
or the “affluenza,” is directly connected to ecological
devastation and unsatisfied, superficial lives. The
HDLB approach, therefore, aims to shift the focus
of human attention and activities from Having to
the less material-intensive dimensions of Doing,
Loving, and Being, which could have significant psy-
chological and socioecological consequences. It
might even contribute to reducing the alleged
“toxicity” of some forms of the discourse on well-
being arising from the omission of sufficiency, con-
tentment, and sustainable ways of life (Atkinson
2020). Moreover, the framework indicates that eco-
nomic growth is not a precondition of well-being,
because due to the holistic nature of the latter,
income and material resources cannot act as a sub-
stitute for its other dimensions.
Bridging the gulf between opposite
conceptions of well-being
To recapitulate, the sustainability transformation
requires a sound idea of well-being. However, the
concept of well-being and how to define it cause
disputes and raise passions. Scholars are particularly
divided on two questions: whether to recur to an
224
T. HELNE
objective or a subjective, or a eudaimonic or
hedonic definition (see also Ereaut and Whiting
2008). In this section, I show how these dichotomies
can be transcended through a relational conception
of well-being such as the HDLB approach.
Some scholars (e.g., White 2017, 125–126) are
quite critical of the concept of subjective well-being
(as they understand it), and certain of them even
contend that the predominant ways of conceptualiz-
ing and “practicing” subjective well-being are toxic
and harmful to well-being outcomes (Atkinson
2020). I shall first discuss some forms of this criti-
cism, and then show how they can be
circumvented.5
While social policy has often been focused on
listing items that are thought to constitute
“objective” well-being, interest in subjective well-
being has increased (Dolan and Metcalfe 2012,
409–410). Subjective well-being also dominates well-
being research within psychology and in the
“economics of happiness.” Some regard this as a
dangerous trend that may lead to the adoption of
an individualist ideology in well-being research
(Fowers 2012, 2), in line with an atomistic ontology
in which the person is seen as metaphysically separ-
ate from other persons (Christopher 1999). The cri-
tique sometimes targets both hedonic and
eudaimonic approaches that are conceived of as
conceptualizing “an individual’s well-being in isola-
tion; individualistically and in a decontextualized
way, distinct from interdependent systems” (Kjell
2011, 5).
What makes individualism such a hazardous
ideology is its close bond with consumerism. If sub-
jective well-being is perceived as sitting squarely
within today’s individualistic culture (Christopher
1999, 144), the criticism is understandable.
According to White (2017, 126), the “apparent
innocence” of subjective well-being hides the
notion’s ideological side, that is, its affinity with
market research. The measures of subjective well-
being position people as consumers who rate how
satisfied they are with their lives, which is inter-
preted as rating one’s success. “It is difficult to
imagine a context more likely to produce a ‘false
self’,” White (2017, 126) concludes.
The notion of subjective well-being is also feared
to result in shoving the responsibility for well-being
entirely on the individual, because subjective well-
being is usually presented as resulting from inner
characteristics À mindset, attitude, personali-
ty À rather than external factors (Atkinson et al.
2020, 1908). One concern is that this could lead to
the retrenchment of welfare states or cutbacks of
state-funded welfare. This could be done on the
grounds that even people suffering from material
deprivation may rate their quality of life as highly as
those who are much better-off (White 2010, 166). If
people are poor but happy, why bother?
Resentment against the notion of subjective well-
being is thus closely related to the critique of neo-
liberalism and its dogma that people should always
be responsible for themselves and their well-being.
Subjective well-being is increasingly represented as a
process of internal management and control, which
may lead to demands of self-management and posi-
tioning failures of well-being as a failure of respon-
sible citizenship (Atkinson 2013, 140–141). This lack
of success could also be described as a failure in ful-
filling one’s responsibility to consume more and
more (see also Davies 2015).
Research focusing on subjective well-being gener-
ally measures well-being by asking how satisfied
individuals are with their life. Because of this, sub-
jective well-being is sometimes assumed to be
hedonic, that is, related to seeking pleasure (Huta
and Ryan 2010, 738). Since hedonism can be
regarded as consistent with the strivings of the
growth economy in which the good life is synonym-
ous with material affluence and increasing material
satisfaction, the aptness of a hedonic definition of
well-being in promoting sustainability has been cast
in doubt (Brand-Correa and Steinberger 2017; Lamb
and Steinberger 2017). Nevertheless, the notion has
been popular in sustainability-oriented research, a
topic to which I return later.
There are, however, counterarguments to these
critiques. First, one should not confound the idea of
subjectivity with how subjective well-being is usually
measured (as satisfaction).
Second, subjective well-being need not be identi-
fied with the ethos of individualism. Instead, sub-
jectivity can be understood relationally. Relational
ontology À on which the HDLB approach is based À
differs from individualistic and atomistic ontology
in that its founding stone is relatedness to other
people and the surrounding world. In what Barbara
Muraca (2016, 19) has termed radically relational
ontology, relations are conceived of as “ontologically
prior to and constitutive of entities rather than
being conceived as an external link(ing) between
them.” However, being a part of the Web of life
does not exclude the subjectivity of human experi-
ences. Our selves are relational (e.g., Gergen 2009),
but our experiences are subjective. The concepts of
relational self and relational well-being thus provide
an account of subjectivity that can challenge domin-
ant ideologies of the self (White 2017, 133) À their
construct of a narrow, separate, and therefore a
false self.
Third, because our selves are relational, our well-
being does not depend entirely on ourselves.
SUSTAINABILITY: SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY
225
Instead, it always depends on our social and natural
environment. Relational ontology thus contributes
to warding off the danger of representing the indi-
vidual in isolation (see also White 2010, 165).
Relational ontology also signifies that the subjective
and the “objective” are intertwined (see also Bu€chs
and Koch 2017, 66) – to the extent that there are
actually no grounds for making a distinction
between them. Well-being thus emerges through the
dynamic interplay of the two (White 2017, 127).
Since we can only have our experience of our life
situation, the “objective” merges with the
“subjective,” forming a non-dual entity.
The HDLB approach belongs to the category of
needs-based theories of well-being. Needs are usu-
ally presented as being “objective” (Doyal and
Gough 1991; Gough 2017b; Soper 2007), and indeed
they are, in the sense that they are innate, universal,
over-generational, and non-substitutable (Gough
2017a, 3; Max-Neef 1992). However, the fulfillment
or non-fulfillment of a need is felt on a personal
level. Because of this, the concept of needs cuts
across the issue of subjectivity vs. objectivity.
The relational interplay or confluence of the sub-
jective and the “objective” means that the responsi-
bility for actualizing well-being can never be an
exclusively individual affair. Because until recent
years, well-being research has largely ignored
nature’s profound meaning for ensuring well-being,
the HDLB approach spotlights the ecosystemic
embeddedness of all the dimensions of well-being.
This in no way excludes the social embeddedness of
well-being. The prerequisites of well-being are social
and ecological, beyond solely individual responsibil-
ity. Each of us, nevertheless, answers for our own
part in the collective responsibility, in doing right
by other beings and the planet.
Fourth, hedonia should not be confounded with
subjective well-being, as hedonism represents a
crude version of conceptualizing it (Gasper 2007,
60). Instead of assuming a priori that subjective
well-being is hedonic, one should rather empirically
test how it relates to both hedonia and eudaimonia
(Huta and Ryan 2010, 738). Moreover, identifying
subjective well-being with hedonia narrows down
the scale of the former, excluding the “pleasures of
virtue.” This can also be detrimental to the eudai-
monic conception of well-being, because eudaimonia
may become pictured as something grim, a life of
rigid righteousness and gloom.
Fifth, there is inherently nothing wrong with
pleasure. Without it, human life would be joyless
indeed. There are, however, harmful and less harm-
ful ways of seeking enjoyment. To apply a term
from need theory, there is a difference between not
only needs and their satisfiers (Max-Neef 1992) but
also between pleasure and its satisfiers. One can, for
example, get pleasure from eating either sustainably
or unsustainably. Moreover, enjoyment need not
refer to material consumption. On the contrary,
hedonic pleasures can also be emotional-cognitive,
such as enjoyment of togetherness or art (Huta and
Ryan 2010).
This brings us to the sixth point. The contrast
between hedonic and eudaimonic emphases has
been perceived as a fundamental divide in well-
being studies, perhaps even more so than the con-
trast between subjective and “objective” conceptions
(Gasper 2009, 20–21). Yet the rift between hedonia
and eudaimonia may be less deep than usu-
ally pictured.
This holds true even for Aristotle, the epitome of
eudaimonic well-being theory. For him, eudaimonia
was the highest human end, reached as a result of
virtue. However, this in no way excludes the right
kinds of pleasure. On the contrary, Aristotle deems
virtuous actions not only good and noble but also
pleasant in themselves. For him, eudaimonia “is the
best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world.”
(Aristotle [384–322] 2016, 17, 20–21).
While Aristotle used the word eudaimon as a
synonym of eu z^en (living well) (Kraut 2018), in our
time eudaimonia is usually translated as well-being,
happiness, or flourishing. Blaine Fowers (2012, 5),
preferring the last-mentioned translation, defines
eudaimonia as “living a complete human life that is
fully realized through virtuous activity.” If this is
not pleasurable, what is?
To give an opposite example, the theory of
another Greek philosopher, Epicurus, is commonly
characterized as hedonic. However, his ideas differ
from hedonism as it is commonly understood, since
they center on freedom from physical and mental
suffering, living a peaceful and simple life, and
attaining peace of mind (Konstan 2018). For
Epicurus ([341–270] 2014), wisdom and pleasure go
hand in hand: “It is impossible to live a pleasant life
without living wisely and well and justly, and it is
impossible to live wisely and well and justly without
living pleasantly.”
Since one can imagine such a thing as “wise
hedonism,” hedonism does not necessarily exclude
deeds done for the planet, which explains the popu-
larity of the hedonic notion of well-being in “green”
social research and environmental research. These
fields of study highlight the pleasures of sustainabil-
ity, arguing that it is possible to decouple well-being
from increasing consumption by focusing on other
dimensions of well-being and that a sustainable
society is compatible with an improvement in peo-
ple’s well-being, and does not require “unrealistic
demands of altruism and morality” (O’Neill 2006,
226
T. HELNE
160). In other words, the focus is on the “double
dividend,” a win-win situation of simultaneously
reducing environmental impacts and improving
well-being (Jackson 2008).
Psychological research has supported this possi-
bility, as people’s reports of their well-being and
pro-ecological behavior have been found to be posi-
tively correlated (e.g., Brown and Kasser 2005;
Kasser 2017). Numerous studies have revealed large
correlations and convergence between hedonic and
eudaimonic well-being also in other fields of life
(O’Neill 2006, 168). This has led Disabato et al.
(2016, 471–472) to the conclusion that evidence for
the theoretical utility and empirical support for dis-
tinguishing the two is questionable. They neverthe-
less admit that the distinction has been helpful in
describing and directing well-being research. This is
to say that even if the line between the two may be
a thin one, both concepts have a role to play. On
the basis of their own findings, Huta and Ryan
(2010) argue that hedonia and eudaimonia occupy
both overlapping and distinct niches within a com-
plete picture of well-being (see also Ryan and Deci
2001, 161). Put another way, achieving an acceptable
and adaptive level of well-being requires both
hedonia and eudaimonia (Atkinson et al. 2020,
1913); it is their combination that brings about the
greatest and most diverse well-being (Huta and
Ryan 2010; McGregor and Little 1998, 759;
Rauschmayer et al. 2011, 8–9). In sum, eudaimonic
and hedonic well-being are relational.
Why can, then, the Having-Doing-Loving-Being
theory be characterized as eudaimonic (Helne and
Hirvilammi 2019)? While this still is a valid descrip-
tion, it must be elaborated: the HDLB approach is
eudaimonic but does not exclude sustain-
able hedonia.
The HDLB approach is a needs-based theory of
well-being, and such theories are counted among
the eudaimonic well-being tradition. The approach,
as I see it, is also eudaimonic in the etymological
sense of the word. The adjective derives from eudai-
monikos, “conducive to happiness,” and the noun
eudaimonia is composed of two parts: eu, (meaning
“good”) and daimon (meaning guiding spirit, lesser
god or tutelary deity.6 Some researchers have
defined eudaimonia as living in truth to one’s
daimon, or the true self (Forgeard et al. 2011;
Waterman 2008), and this is also how I could char-
acterize well-being, particularly on the dimension
of Being.
The eudaimonic perspective has been described
as focusing on the individual in his or her broader
social context (Brand-Correa and Steinberger 2017,
44). Also in the HDLB approach, the highest good,
well-being, is understood relationally. The hedonic
approach has been criticized for its atomistic
approach as well as having no concern for future
generations (Brand-Correa and Steinberger 2017,
44). However, it is possible to get pleasure from
other people’s well-being – perhaps even if they are
not yet born. Survey data from several international
and national databases shows that expecting the best
(the worst) for future generations has a very large
positive (negative) impact on subjective well-being
(Bartolini et al. 2014). Moreover, according to John
O’Neill (2006, 162–163), nothing in the hedonic
position rules out concerns for future generations;
combined with a suitable ethical theory it can even
entail strong obligations for them.
An often presented criticism toward hedonic con-
ceptions is that well-being should include not only
what feels good but what is good (see White 2016,
18). Nonetheless, as discussed above, not all that
feels good is ethically bad. The critique of hedonism
best hits its target when the focus is on “radical
hedonism,” in which well-being is equated with
maximum pleasure and the satisfaction of any desire
or want one may have (Fromm [1976] 1997, 2–5),
disregarding their content and the consequences of
acting on their basis. However, the gratification of
wants or desires need not be materialistic or harm-
ful to oneself or one’s environment. As Kate Soper
points out, it is possible to cease to automatically
connect satisfying wants with tangible goods and
link them with more intangible and spiritual dimen-
sions of satisfaction. She speaks of “alternative
hedonism” in which consumerist forms of consump-
tion are restricted but more sensory pleasures are
enhanced through better health, more free time, and
so forth (Soper 2007, 370). One might also intro-
duce the concept of “hedonic eudaimonia” in order
to shed light on the fact that eudaimonia does not
have to exclude hedonia. All that feels good need
not be unsustainable; even the contrary might
be true.
As for the HDLB approach, well-being on each
dimension of need satisfaction can be either hedonic
or eudaimonic – or both.
Having: Capitalism is based on the dogma that
people cannot and must not ever be satisfied. In a
sense, the tenet holds true, because a life guided by
material wants and oriented to excessive having is
bound to be a dissatisfied one (e.g., Kashdan and
Breen 2007; Kasser 2002; Solberg et al. 2004). By
contrast, fulfilling one’s needs of existential Having
can be as well meaningful as pleasurable.
Doing: There is empirical support to the hypoth-
esis that engaging in pro-ecological behavior helps
to satisfy psychological needs (Kasser 2017, 5–6).
Put another way, this kind of Doing is both ethically
and ecologically responsible as well as deeply
SUSTAINABILITY: SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY
227
gratifying; hence eudaimonia allies with hedonia (as
in any meaningful Doing).
Loving is an experience that is by definition
pleasurable when speaking of real love (and not ego-
istic clinging and an urge to fill up an internal
void). Loving is also connected to being ethical: one
who loves wants only what is best for those he or
she cares for, whether human or non-human. To
love is to be responsible, to find meaning in life –
and hence, to feel good.
The dimension of Being is largely about self-
actualization, being true to one’s inner calling and
one’s self; flourishing as a human being. These expe-
riences are hallmarks of eudaimonic well-being –
but also deeply satisfying and pleasurable states.
In summary, when our needs on all the dimen-
sions of well-being are fulfilled in a balanced way, we
are likely to live a life full of happiness and meaning.
There is also the possibility of a substantial bonus if
the hypothesis that people who are happy or at least
temporarily in a pleasant mood engage in more pro-
ecological behavior holds true (Kasser 2017).
Conclusion
Richard Louv (2005) has coined the term “nature-
deficit disorder” to serve as a description of alien-
ation from nature and to emphasize the importance
of exposure to natural settings for physical and
emotional health. Today, “nature-deficit disorder”
could be understood in an even grimmer sense: as
the loss of nature and biodiversity, and the eco-anx-
iety many people consequently suffer from. The
connection between subjective and planetary well-
being, therefore, deserves more attention than ever.
Pursuing well-being and sustainability can and must
be done in tandem. Nature is a central constituent
of human well-being – our eudaimonia, if you like,
and in that case, the concept “nature-inclusive
eudaimonia” (Knippenberg et al. 2018) is most use-
ful, but why not speak of nature-inclusive
hedonia, too?
For some, nature connectedness is a visceral feel-
ing, and nature’s significance for their well-being or
the intrinsic value of nature needs no further justifi-
cations. However, due mainly to our technocratic
and consumerist culture, there are many whose
nature connectedness is weak or lacking. This is
why we need public discourse focusing on nature’s
beneficial effect on health and well-being verified by
extensive empirical evidence (see, e.g., Capaldi,
Dopko, and Zelensky 2014; Capaldi et al. 2015;
Trigwell et al. 2014). In other words, attention
should be directed to relational well-being, that is,
nature-inclusive eudaimonia and/or hedonia.
Stressing the positive connection between well-being
and nature in research and public and policy dis-
course could lead to more pro-nature thinking,
behavior, and practices, which could, in turn, give
considerable impetus to the sustainability transform-
ation (see also Barrington-Leigh 2016; Richardson et
al. 2020). Well-being has to be re-rooted in nature
in every aspect, and this is what the Having-Doing-
Loving-Being approach aims to do. Moreover, the
approach turns the attention to those dimensions of
well-being (those categories of needs) whose actual-
ization is not dependent on material resources only,
which undermines the goal of economic growth but
accentuates growing as a human being. The frame-
work, therefore, offers an alternative narrative of
well-being to better guide individuals and societies
toward more sustainable and satisfying ways of life.
The huge step human societies need to take in
order to achieve sustainability can be described as a
shift from human exemptionalism to a relational
paradigm (Hirvilammi and Helne 2014). In different
terms, but the same spirit, Andreas Weber has char-
acterized the transformation that awaits us as a shift
from a technocratic, economic, and dualist
“Enlightenment paradigm” to an “Enlivenment para-
digm.” It is a worldview in which “lived experience,
embodied meaning, material exchange and subject-
ivity are key factors” – a worldview in stark contrast
to the dominant paradigm that “deliberately ignores
the fact that we are subjective, feeling humans –
members of an animal species whose living metabo-
lisms are in constant material exchange with the
world” (Weber 2013, 11). Reminding ourselves of
this relationality and the interconnectedness of per-
sonal and planetary well-being is an urgent task on
a planet on the brink of collapse.
Notes
1. For discussions of “sustainability transformation,” see,
e.g., Abson et al. (2017), Salomaa and Juhola (2020),
and UNRISD (2016).
2. See http://dictionary.com.
3. The HDLB categories are similar to Max-Neef’s
(1992) “needs according to existential categories,”
namely Having, Doing, Being, and Interacting. I have
second-hand information that Max-Neef was familiar
with Allardt’s theory. Unfortunately, I did not verify
this with Max-Neef himself before he passed away.
4. Allardt (1990, 1993) did think that environmental
factors should be taken into consideration in the
assessment of a society’s level of welfare, but he was
quite critical of how he succeeded in this objective.
5. For further critique, see, e.g., Table 2 in
Atkinson (2020).
6. See Online etymology dictionary.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by
the authors.
228
T. HELNE
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