Is Broad the New Deep in Environmental Ethics? A Comparison of Broad Ecological Justice
and Deep Ecology
Author(s): Teea Kortetmäki
Source: Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring 2016), pp. 89-108
Published by: Indiana University Press
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IS BROAD THE NEW DEEP IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS?
A COMPARISON OF BROAD ECOLOGICAL
JUSTICE AND DEEP ECOLOGY
TEEA KORTETMÄKI
Abstract
I argue in this article that a theory of broad ecological justice or the extended
capabilities approach, an interesting approach in contemporary environmental
ethics, shares many of its core ideas with deep ecology and Arne Næss’s ecosophy
T. The similarities between these approaches include the ambition to address the
roots of environmental problems, emphasis on recognition and the criticism of
oppressive structures, and a systemic orientation. Acknowledging these similari-
ties illustrates the contemporary value of the deep ecology movement. It also helps
to develop the theory of broad ecological justice further, especially in terms of
bridging the gap between movements and theoretical discussion.
WHAT IS ‘BROAD’ IN BROAD ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE?
There are different views on which issues can be considered as ques-
tions of justice. Until rather recently, the distributive paradigm, or the view
that justice is primarily and mostly an issue of distributing certain goods,
has dominated the discussion in social justice (Fraser 2009, 32–34). Today,
distributive paradigm has been challenged by the idea that justice also has
other important dimensions such as recognition—the ‘cultural’ dimension
of justice that concerns respect and social relations—and participation (or
representation), the ‘political’ dimension (Fraser 1998; 2009; also Fraser
and Honneth 2003). I propose that this multidimensional approach could
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT 21, no. 1 (2016), 89–108
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be labeled as a ‘broad’ view of justice, in comparison to a ‘narrower’ frame
that considers distribution as the only element of justice.
Lately, discussion on the broad view of justice has attracted attention
in environmental ethics and ecological justice as well (Schlosberg 2007;
2013; Cripps 2010; Crescenzo 2013). Ecological justice considers certain
non-human entities as proper recipients of justice, and the broad view of
ecological justice asserts that ecological justice should involve, in addi-
tion to distribution, the elements of recognition and participation. It is
important to note that the broad view does not reject the distributive
dimension of justice: rather, it considers justice to have more dimensions
than distribution alone. In other words, the shift is about extending the
concept of justice.
According to the broad view, injustice does not arise merely from mal-
distribution, but is tied to issues of recognition and representation. As
Nancy Fraser (2009) argues, these two additional dimensions are needed
in order to understand today’s forms of (in)justice and justice claims.
Whereas distribution can usually be understood as the economic or mate-
rial dimension of justice, recognition refers to the cultural (with regard to
the respect and consideration of others) and representation to the political
dimension of justice. Iris Young (1990, 15–38) asserts that the distribu-
tive paradigm tends to presuppose and obscure the institutional contexts
determining material distribution, and that it also produces an incom-
plete social ontology, consequently misrepresenting the justice related to
immaterial things. The focus on maldistribution does not pay attention
to the structures and practices that are themselves unjust and (re)produce
maldistribution.
These structural factors can be addressed and evaluated using the
notions of recognition and representation. In the context of non-hu-
man nature, recognition can be understood as showing “...respect for
nature’s ‘bodily integrity’, the recognition of the potential in nature
to develop, its autonomy, resilience, or a respect for autopoiesis”
(Schlosberg 2007, 136). This recognition is present and visible, or lack-
ing, in the cultural practices and beliefs of a particular community. For
example, by recognizing a river, the community respects the autonomy
of the river and its potential to sustain itself. Harming or benefiting
from the river system becomes a moral question in addition to, or
on a par with, the treatment of other recognized entities such as per-
sons. Although analyzing the impediments of recognition is important
in helping reduce distributive injustice, it is not the whole point. The
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obstacles of recognition that often arise from institutional processes
and social and cultural beliefs essentially constitute the cases of injus-
tice in themselves. There is no justice without recognition.
Participatory or representational justice is, in turn, a prerequi-
site for implementing recognition (Schlosberg 2007, 157); like Fraser
(1998; 2009) and Nussbaum (2011), Schlosberg argues that equality in
representation is an integral part of any definition of justice. This also
applies in the case of ecological justice. For Fraser (2009, 17–18), this
political dimension deals with questions of inclusion, exclusion, and the
decision-making rules and participatory parity among the included; these
cannot be reduced to other dimensions of (in)justice. Only humans give
speeches and are able to participate directly in politics, yet it is possible
to include non-human nature in political decision-making as well (for the
discussion on this issue, see for example Dryzek 1996; Mathews 1996;
Eckersley 1999; Dobson 2010).
Environmental and ecological justice1 theories have mainly been nar-
row and concerned with the distribution of resources and burdens. These
approaches lack theoretical tools to “discuss valid issues of justice that
the distributive paradigm simply cannot encompass” (Schlosberg 2007,
125). This problem particularly related to recognition: plainly distributive
theories of justice do not consider it as a requirement for justice, which
in turn enables disregarding various instances of misrecognition such as
domination, humiliation, and disrespect, in the framework of justice. The
victims of such practices would be denied the possibility of making justice
claims in relation to such affairs.
To be fair, not all distribution-oriented environmental theorists ignore
the aspect of recognition. For instance, Brian Baxter (2005, 4; 117–23)
speaks of recognizing the claim of other life forms to a fair share of
environmental resources. Satisfying the welfare interests of non-humans
requires a fair share of resources, and those interests invoke claims of
justice whose proper recognition and respect is to be defended by proxies
that “articulate the interests of inarticulates.” Recognizing the potential
of nature has also been given a central role by some earlier thinkers (Low
and Gleeson 1998). Yet the flaw in such approaches is that the obstacles
or prerequisites for recognition are not addressed (Schlosberg 2007, 132).
A more detailed critical examination of the distributive accounts of envi-
ronmental and ecological justice is offered by Schlosberg (2007, 103–25),
illustrating how those approaches fail to encompass the full spectrum of
injustice.
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The importance of recognition is brought out not only by broad jus-
tice theorists but by environmental movements as well. Several move-
ments have demanded recognition in its different forms: recognition of
different cultures and cultural identities; of local practices and forms of
knowledge; and for example in the case of climate change, of the rights
of women, youth, and indigenous peoples (Schlosberg 2007, 86–89). The
importance of the representational dimension of justice, or the parity
of participation, has also been mentioned both in the demands of vari-
ous movements as well as in related academic discussions. For example,
Bryan G. Norton emphasized the importance of participation, encourag-
ing community participation combined with good science (Norton 2005,
492–98). As environmental ethics arises from the motivation to respond
to the worry invoked by environmental problems and risks, it is clear
that a feasible theory of environmental and ecological justice should be
able to listen to the environmental movements and provide an applicable
grammar of justice.
The shortages of a plainly distributive approach have also been
exemplified in the recent (2012–2015) Finnish case of the Talvivaara
mine in Kainuu region of Finland. Several lakes near the mine are pop-
ular summer cottage areas. Due to mining practices, the lake water has
become contaminated. Despite a lack of data on the particular chemical
causing this, the water can no longer be used for everyday practices
such as washing, swimming and fishing. Consequently, the Regional
State Administrative Agencies ruled that the Talvivaara mining com-
pany must distribute clean water to the cottage residents (Regional State
Administrative Agency, decision PSAVI/12/04.08/2013). However, as the
national news agency Yle reported on June 20, 2013, this clean water
distribution cannot replace the loss of swimming and fishing opportu-
nities the lake used to offer. Here, the issue is not about distributable
goods, but about the lakes themselves as places to which the people have
special relations. The point is similar to the one made by Schlosberg
(2012, 451) in relation to climate change: the lack of recognition of
people’s relationships with places is a status injury, a case of injustice. A
distributive approach to justice is ill-equipped to fully address the injus-
tices present in situations like this.
In the case of the Talvivaara mine, the broad view of environmen-
tal justice would claim that the residents should have been included
in decision-making in the earlier phases. This has to do with the third,
representational dimension of justice. As the damage has already been
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done, recognizing the cottage residents’ rights to participate in the deci-
sion-making on how the situation could and should be corrected would in
the environmental sense be the minimum condition of doing justice to the
residents. Doing justice to nature would, in addition, require that the lakes
are ‘heard’ or represented as well. This would ensure that the decisions
made would not threaten non-human life and its diversity the way current
mining practices do. The Talvivaara example also shows that attempts
to conduct a monetary harm/benefit analysis of mining, as outlined in
Haltia, Holm, and Hämäläinen (2012), are very problematic: calculating
or distributing incommensurate goods is often hard. Hence, environmen-
tal and ecological justice are not only about distributive justice in relation
to environmental pros and cons as many theorists, such as Baxter (2005,
8), have proposed. They must adopt a broader view to encompass what is
really at stake in environmental issues.
In addition to the three dimensions of justice, broad ecological justice
adopts the discourse of extended capabilities as its fourth dimension. This
idea derives from the framework of human and sentient animal capabil-
ities developed by Nussbaum (2006; 2011): in this account, capabilities
are opportunities that define what an individual is able to do and to be.
Realized capabilities turn into functionings, or actual states of doing and
being. These constitute the overall well-being of an individual. As opposed
to Nussbaum’s individualist approach, Schlosberg promotes applying the
capabilities framework to populations, habitats, or ecosystems. In his
extended capabilities approach, central notions comprise flourishing and
the capabilities that are necessary for enabling flourishing. Doing justice
to nature is primarily about removing the impediments that hinder the
capabilities of nature to reach its functioning and integrity (Schlosberg
2007, 142–54). An important remark here is that Schlosberg uses the
notion of justice in a rather general sense of overall rightness and fairness,
a way similar to many environmental and social movements that demand
justice. The strategy of combining theoretical vocabulary with the gram-
mar used by various movements is the first similarity between Schlosberg
and the deep ecologist Arne Næss, and this observation starts the next
part of this paper, which looks at the structural similarities between the
ideas of broad ecological justice and deep ecology.
NÆSS: PRELIMINARY BROAD ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE
The ‘seeds’ of a broad view of justice can already be found in deep
ecology and especially, in the writings of Arne Næss who strongly
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proposes similar broadness, though this similarity has not been, to my
knowledge, discussed anywhere. The structural similarity of these two
approaches can be examined by looking at the way in which deep ecol-
ogy identifies itself by making a distinction between the shallow and deep
ecological movements. This comparison reveals a remarkable similarity
between the ‘broadness’ of Schlosberg’s approach and the ‘depth’ of deep
ecology.
The differentiation between shallow and deep ecology movements
is crucial, as it justifies the whole label of ‘deep’ as separate from other
approaches of environmental ethics and environmental movements. Since
this article focuses on the philosophical and ethical issues rather than ide-
ologies as such, I will keep myself within the theoretical realms of deep
ecology. This is not to say that the link deep ecology builds between the-
ory and practice should be rejected—it is a strength. The same can be
said about Schlosberg’s approach, as one of his clearly stated aims is to
overcome the gap between justice theorizing and environmental justice
movements, which enables both sides to learn from each other (Schlosberg
2007, 5).
The cornerstone of deep ecology, or what makes deep ecology deep,
is the demand for broader change than is allowed or required by shallow
approaches. At stake is not just “a slight reform of our present society,
but a substantial reorientation of our whole civilisation” (Næss 1989,
45). Instead of treating environmental problems separately and in isola-
tion, changes should be made in the economic policies, ideological struc-
tures, and cultural practices to address the reasons beyond the problems
(Næss 1986, 405–7; revised 1989, 28–32). Whereas shallow movements
do not question prevailing practices, “[s]upporters of the long-range
deep ecology movement take a broader view” (Drengson 2008, 26). The
shallow approach favors technological fixes and cost/benefit analyses,
whereas deep ecology aims to promote cultural and social change, espe-
cially in industrial societies (Næss 1986). Furthermore, deepness means
deeper argumentation that can be traced back to our ultimate premises
and worldviews instead of remaining in the normative and political level
(Næss 2008, 105–19). Although the shallow approach is often labeled
anthropocentric and the deep approach ecocentric, the shallow–deep
distinction does not necessitate centrism-related notions, as will be seen
below. Rather, the deep ecological principles can be arrived at from very
different ultimate worldviews (concerning, for instance, their religious
contents).
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The above distinctions made by deep ecology resemble those that
demarcate the distributive or narrow paradigms of justice from the
broad view: the latter argues for going beyond maldistribution in order
to identify the structures and practices that constitute and contribute to
injustice. This call to go beyond the ‘symptoms of injustice,’ asking how
the injustice is produced and reproduced, has been expressed clearly by
Young (1990, 22) and Fraser (2000), two influential advocates of broad
(or multidimensional) views of justice. According to this viewpoint,
making the world more just requires changes in the economic, social,
and cultural realms, rather than just corrections when the injustice has
occurred.
Sustainability, despite being a contested and vague concept, is often
endorsed as a general guideline that should steer the actions of human
societies. From this viewpoint, there is a significant similarity in the atti-
tudes shared by deep ecology and broad ecological justice. Because (re)dis-
tribution only corrects the problems that have been realized but does not
deal with their roots, it does not help to prevent future problems. To put
forward an analogy, distributive justice is like palliative ‘sick-care’ while
multidimensional or broad justice aims to work in the spirit of preventive
health care. In health politics, many of us intuitively favor the latter: it
is better to prevent than to treat. If taken as an eligible goal, sustain-
ability would require a shift toward preventive politics—a view endorsed
by both deep ecology and broad ecological justice. As Schlosberg (2007,
126) puts it: “any attempt to find common ground between sustainability
and justice necessitates an examination and understanding of misrecog-
nition—not just maldistribution—of both those communities striving for
environmental justice and the natural world.”
The arguments made this far have shown that the shallow–deep dis-
tinction made by deep ecology is structurally similar to the narrow–broad
(or distributive–multidimensional) ecological justice distinction, and deep
ecology is ‘on the same side’ with Schlosberg’s broad ecological justice.
On this account, I find it useful to deepen this comparison, as there is a
chance for mutual learning if a more detailed analysis reveals more simi-
larities between the approaches. In order to see whether this is the case, I
next compare the keystones of ‘broadness’ in Schlosberg’s approach with
the main points of deep ecology. First, the three dimensions of justice—
distribution, recognition, and representation—are discussed. After that, I
discuss capabilities, the last important element of Schlosberg’s framework
from which the name extended capabilities approach is also derived.
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DISTRIBUTION, RECOGNITION AND REPRESENTATION
IN DEEP ECOLOGY
To claim similarity between deep ecology and broad ecological jus-
tice, it is necessary to examine the relationship between deep ecology and
the three dimensions of justice. After all, a demand for going ‘beyond the
problems’ and arguing for change in the whole society does not, in itself
entail that deep ecology would agree with the demands for recognition
and representation. The comparison in the next passages rests mostly on
the writings of Næss on deep ecology. At some points, I refer particularly
to his own ecosophy T (T as Tvergastein, the place Næss greatly identified
with). Ecosophies are the individual level applications of deep ecological
principles, and they are best understood as personalized combinations of
personal ultimate worldviews, premises, and shared deep ecological ideas
“philosophies of life”.
The motive for adding ecosophy T writings to my comparison is that
those texts are exceptionally insightful in their approach to conceptualiz-
ing self-realization, which significantly resembles the way capabilities and
flourishing are linked in the capabilities approach (and the capability ele-
ment of broad ecological justice). Moreover, ecosophy T texts offer a valu-
able example on how a personal ecosophy—the “individual outcome” of
deep ecology—can be compatible with broad ecological justice. However,
it must be kept in mind that ecosophy T is not the same as deep ecology;
it is only an example of a personal worldview that can be adopted within
the framework of deep ecology, an ‘applied version’ of a more general
framework. The use of ecosophy T in this article is comparative and illus-
trative; the reader should keep in mind that rather than promote his own
Tvergastein ecosophy, Næss invites everyone to create their own ecoso-
phies inspired by the general deep ecology platform (Drengson 2008, 39).
The first dimension of justice, distribution, is so integral to all
approaches that it is unnecessary to deal with it in great detail here. Like
other authors, Næss (1989) discusses distribution in relation to humans
and non-human nature. With respect to distributable resources, Næss
focuses on the argument that human use of natural resources is excessive.
Although he focuses on human–nature-relations, Næss observes the prob-
lems of class differences and exploitation among humans (Næss 1989,
136–40; 206–7).
Recognition, the second dimension of justice, is related to cultural
practices and attitudes that have been institutionalized, as was earlier
described. In this context recognition is understood as adequate regard
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(as opposed to a narrower mutuality insight, in which recognition
requires mutuality and therefore excludes any possibility of the recogni-
tion of non-persons; cf. Laitinen 2010). Misrecognition can take different
forms of which Fraser (1998, 7) has constructed a typology: 1) general
cultural domination, 2) non-recognition or ignorance, and 3) disrespect
(visible in public and cultural representations). Respectively, on the more
just side, cultural recognition can take at least three different forms:
non-domination, non-ignorance or ‘visibility’, and respect.
The deep ecology platform (Næss 1989, 29), or a set of general views
as Næss later preferred to call it (Clark 2010, 29), emphasizes general
respect for nature. The list states that every being has the right to blos-
som. The uniqueness of our species does not justify domination (or the
overall prioritization of human interests, whether vital or not) and mis-
treatment. Rather, it should lead to the attitude of universal care (Næss
1989, 171). Deep ecology embraces biospherical egalitarianism, “in prin-
ciple”: it is acknowledged in early deep ecology literature that living a life
always necessitates some exploitation and suppression of other life forms
(Næss 1973). Yet, this biospherical egalitarianism entails that exploita-
tion of nature always requires careful consideration and justification. This
demand for non-domination of other forms of life is similar to the first
form of recognition, nondomination. Moreover, in the early work on deep
ecology, Næss (1973, 97) criticizes the ignorance of biospherical relation-
ships and the effect of human disturbances on non-human nature. This
can be interpreted as the criticism of ignorance, another form of mis-
recognition. Biospherical egalitarianism is one, though not the only way
to increase the recognition of non-human nature.
More passages criticize human domination or the prioritization of
human interests in all situations, and ignorance towards nature. The dis-
cussion takes place in the political context but belongs in the realm of
recognition as the focus is on cultural values and assumptions rather than
inclusions of politics. For example, Næss accused the prevailing economic
and political paradigms of pursuing the domination of nature. Economic
growth ignores the external effects that economic activities may have on
non-human welfare, as gross national product for example, turns non-hu-
man nature invisible (Næss 1989, 110–16). Nature must be rendered
politically more visible. One example of answering to this call is the prac-
tice of environmental impact assessment (EIA) adopted by several nations.
However, this assessment has not been used in many decisions that affect
non-human nature.
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Respect, the third form of recognition, is an important principle in deep
ecological thinking. In the eight-point platform, the call for respect con-
cerns the richness and diversity of life forms (Næss 1989, 29). This appre-
ciation is understood to entail normative commitments—appreciating life
in its different forms obliges one to carefully consider the effects one’s
actions may have on other living entities. Næss is also worried about the
disrespect for traditional cultures as a growing problem, which he links to
the disrespect for land and an instrumental, careless utilization of nature
(Næss 2008, 281–82). The problem for Næss concerns not only the dis-
respectful treatment of nature but also of the peoples. The prerequisite
for respecting a particular culture is its sustainability, but in unsustain-
able cases, condemnation should concern unsustainable practices rather
than take the form of disrespect for the people performing those practices
(Næss 2008, 141).
As the examples above indicate, distributive and recognitional dimen-
sions of justice are important for deep ecology. The third dimension of
justice, representation or participation, is more complicated as regards its
role in deep ecological thought. In broad ecological justice, the participa-
tory aspect is essential for Schlosberg. He elaborates on different prob-
lems and possibilities related to non-human participation and inclusion
in democratic decision-making and discusses strategies for internalizing
nature into politics (Schlosberg 2007, 187–210). Compared to the central-
ity of politics found here, participatory issues play a substantially smaller
role in deep ecology. Instead of focusing on politics, many writers on deep
ecology, and especially Næss, emphasize individual (and cultural) change
(e.g., Næss 1987; 1989; 1993; 2002).
One reason for the individual emphasis adopted by Næss is that a
central theme in many of his writings is self-realization or the expan-
sion of the self (as formulated in the Spinozist tradition), which is an
individual process. This identification with the whole living world leads,
according to Næss, to a situation in which one is naturally inclined to act
on the principle of avoiding harming life more than is necessary. After
all, harming others is harming yourself, or to be precise, your ecological
self (Næss 1987; 1993). If every human being attained self-realization,
there would hardly be the need for environmental ethics or politics. A
similar idea of identification with the biosphere is present in the early
works of Warwick Fox when he still defended deep ecology (Fox 1989).
However, it is important to remember that self-realization is not a part of
the theoretical deep ecology approach; it belongs to the personal views (or
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ecosophies) of Næss and possibly, other proponents. Even in this context,
Næss admits that increasing sensitivity toward diversity is also a political
question (Næss 1987, 40).
Despite the bias Næss has towards individual change, the politi-
cal realm is already included in the eight-point deep ecology platform,
although the exact formulation has varied slightly over the years. It states
that “(6) Significant change of life conditions for the better requires
change in policies. These affect basic economic, technological, and ideo-
logical structures.” (Næss 1989, 29) Moreover, Næss views it “...desirable
that everyone in the ecological movement engage in political activity”
(ibid., 130). The question then is: what kind of policies does deep ecology
endorse, especially in terms of inclusion, exclusion, and internalization
of the non-human world into decisions? Local autonomy and decentral-
ization have been at the core of deep ecology from its inception (Næss
1973). For Næss, this entails endorsing direct democracy combined with
local equality where ‘the bottom’ and ‘the top’ can work and live together.
Furthermore, democratic inclusion is not to be limited to humans but
should lead to a “democracy of life forms” (Næss 1989, 144; 175). In
terms of ecological justice and its participatory dimension, this view
entails as broad non-human inclusion as possible.
The examples above indicate that the three dimensions of broad eco-
logical justice match well with the ideas of deep ecology, although differ-
ences in the areas of emphasis can be found. Broad ecological justice has
in its broadness many similar features with those that make deep ecology
deep. Next, I elaborate on whether deep ecology meets the second char-
acterization of the broadness of Schlosberg’s approach, namely the struc-
ture of capabilities discourse. Granted that deep ecology does not use the
grammar of capabilities directly, are there any grounds for claiming that
deep ecology could be considered a capabilities-oriented approach?
CAPABILITIES, FUNCTIONINGS, AND FLOURISHING
Flourishing is at the heart of deep ecological thinking. The eight-point
deep ecology platform declares that both human and non-human flourish-
ing have intrinsic value, which is understood as value that is independent
of any instrumental value. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute
to both human and non-human flourishing. A decrease in the human pop-
ulation is required in the long run for the sake of non-human flourishing,
but this can be made compatible with a flourishing human life. (Næss
1989, 29–30.)
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When Schlosberg integrates the capabilities approach with ecological
justice, flourishing is also one of the key concepts. For Schlosberg (2013, 44)
the main concern is what restrains the living systems “. . .from transform-
ing primary goods into the functioning, integrity, and flourishing of those
that depend on them.” The disruption of these processes and systems leads
to decreased functionings and capabilities, and both human and non-hu-
man well-being is threatened. However, Schlosberg is not the first one who
connects flourishing to the capabilities vocabulary; Nussbaum views it as
the ultimate end as well. According to Nussbaum (2011, 32–33), the task
of government is to enable people to flourish and pursue a dignified life.
The importance of flourishing connects Nussbaum, Schlosberg, and Næss.
Næss further connects flourishing to the idea of self-realization in
his own ecosophy, whereby flourishing requires self-realization. Self-
realization refers to the fulfillment of inherent potentialities that are pecu-
liar for that particular species or being (Næss 1987, 37). In the case of
human beings, this realization of potentialities leads to a broadened con-
ception of the self that seeks to promote the flourishing of other beings as
well. As Næss (2008, 132) states: “The mature human individual, with a
broadened self [...] seeks a social order, or rather a biospheric order, that
maximizes the potential for self-realization of all kinds of beings”.
This idea of self-realization that requires the fulfillment of necessary
potentials connects the ecosophy of Næss with the capabilities approach
through structural similarity. Whereas capabilities are potentials, self-re-
alization refers to the process of turning these potentials into function-
ings. Consider the following example: every human being (born with
normal psychological abilities) has the potential to use his emotional
traits. The ability to realize this potential equals the fifth central capa-
bility of Nussbaum, the capability to have emotions and form attach-
ments. Realizing the capability results in different functionings, such as
loving and caring, that contribute to the flourishing of that individual. The
potential of emotional traits is also linked to other capabilities, the details
of which cannot be delved into here. Nevertheless, the link from potentials
to flourishing can be formulated as follows:
Næss: Potentials {a,b,c...} → Realization of potentials that contribute to
self-realization → self-realization, state of flourishing
Nussbaum/Schlosberg: Potentials {a,b,c...} → (Central) capabilities
{x,y,z...} → a set of functionings realized from capabilities → well-being
or flourishing
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The conceptual relationship is similar in both cases, and like Nussbaum
and Schlosberg, Næss focuses on protecting the potentials that are import-
ant for flourishing. This entails for him, the general principle of minimiz-
ing the interference with non-human nature: present human effects on
non-human nature are excessively harmful. However, it is important to
acknowledge that human interference with non-human nature is unavoid-
able, and that not all of the effects are bad—the quality and extent of the
interference matters (Næss 1989, 29–30). Now, a proviso must be made:
this discussion concerns only the ecosophy. Self-realization is not repre-
sented in general deep ecology (in this sense, ecosophy T perhaps goes
even ‘deeper’ than the general deep ecology platform). Yet, I contend that
even if the notion of self-realization is removed, the essential link from
potentials to flourishing would be in line with general deep ecological
thought. Næss simply offers the best clarification of the connection, and
spices it with the idea of self-realization.
The idea of promoting non-human capabilities (or potentials, in
Næss’s terminology) by non-interference is suggested as a way to under-
stand the notion of doing ecological justice in the context of capabilities
(Cripps 2010). The link between promoting environmental capabilities
and the ecocentric argument of ‘letting nature take its course’ (within
certain limits) is also observed by Schlosberg (2007, 152). The limitation
refers to the fact that there are also harmful potentials and preventing
their realization, or not letting nature take its course, is morally justifi-
able. Letting a malign virus spread may decrease the overall flourishing
of several species and beings, and preventing this kind of epidemic is jus-
tifiable even in terms of maximizing the diversity of flourishing. The dis-
tinction between beneficial and harmful potentials or capabilities needs
multidisciplinary understanding and discussion, combining the descrip-
tive and normative evaluation of how certain potentials affect human
and non-human well-being and whether they are, accordingly, morally
desirable.
The distinction between beneficial or important and harmful capa-
bilities is also made by Nussbaum (2011, 70–72), who argues that the
task of the capabilities approach is to find those capabilities that must be
promoted in order to secure equal dignity and (at least), minimum social
justice for every human being. In the case of the human community, the
capabilities approach does not find the minimized interference principle
sufficient. Rather, capabilities must be actively promoted by a just society.
Næss shares this idea in the human context such that political actions
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should promote the developing and unfolding of different human abilities
(Næss 2008, 127; 132).
I hope to have shown with this discussion that there are clear similar-
ities between deep ecology (especially as it has been represented by Næss)
and the broad ecological justice or extended capabilities approach, a new
discourse introduced by Schlosberg. I am not arguing that these two dis-
courses are identical—far from that. My argument is that the idea of broad
ecological justice, with all the promising characteristics, is not actually as
new an approach as it may at first seem. To avoid painting a picture that
is too simplified, I will next explore the main differences between the deep
ecological and broad ecological views of justice. This comparison also
offers a good place to ask whether these two approaches can learn from
each other. Is there something in deep ecology that, when adopted to the
discourse of broad ecological justice, would help to develop Schlosberg’s
ideas further? Or vice versa?
LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER?
One difference between deep ecology and broad ecological justice is
that deep ecology is widely considered as a form of ecocentrism, whereas
broad ecological justice actively refrains from taking a stance on the cen-
trism debate. Adopting the attitude of Western liberalism, broad ecolog-
ical justice does not commit itself to any particular metaphysical view.
According to Schlosberg (2007, 137), the recognition of nature may first
seem ecocentric but it can be endorsed without appealing to ecocentric ide-
als. It can be argued that this difference prevents mutual learning between
deep ecology and broad ecological justice. This would hold true if broad
ecological justice had to adopt metaphysical arguments from deep ecol-
ogy in order to learn anything from it: in this case, the former would lose
its liberal stance. However, there are actually grounds on which it is plau-
sible to assert that deep ecology does not require adopting a particular
metaphysical stance.
Deep ecology accepts wide pluralism in the level of fundamental worl-
dviews. Næss clarifies this with the so-called Apron diagram (Næss 2005,
63; 2008, 107–8), which notes that the common deep ecology platform,
consisting of penultimate views, can be accepted and adopted by people
who hold very different ultimate philosophical or religious worldviews.
Accepting the platform does not presuppose a particular metaphysical
view, nor consider nature to have inherent value (Næss 2008, 69). Broad
ecological justice endorses pluralism in a similar spirit, holding a view
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that a plurality of justice discourse is not only empirical reality but also
pragmatic necessity (Schlosberg 2007, 167). People with different worl-
dviews and from different discourses may still reach agreement over the
core issues of broad ecological justice. This core could, for example, con-
sist of viewing ecological justice as a multidimensional issue that demands
going beyond maldistribution and considering how injustice is produced
and reproduced in the economic, cultural, and institutional realms. Along
this line, changes would be needed in the economic, cultural and political
realms. Actually, broad ecological justice could be presented with a similar
Apron diagram that was used by Næss. I do not intend to argue that the
supporters of broad ecological justice inevitably endorse deep ecological
view, nor that they should do so. The crux is that both approaches point
to similar solutions, and both accept different worldview holders as their
supporters; hence, endorsing both views is possible. Actually, I believe that
many deep ecology movement supporters (though perhaps not all) would
agree with the core tenets of broad ecological justice.
Another matter here is that Næss holds self-realization central in his
own ecosophy, and self-realization may at first glance seem to require
adopting a particular metaphysical stance, or at least leads to adopting
one (a monist, Spinozist-like worldview). However, it is far from clear
that Næss would claim self-realization to require a particular metaphys-
ical standpoint; indeed, the opposite can be defended as well. After all,
self-realization is not reserved for philosophical beings such as humans
only. Næss (2008, 95) mentions the self-realization of a praying mantis
as an example. As a praying mantis is unlikely to hold a metaphysical
worldview, it is questionable why human self-realization would require
holding a particular worldview, as it cannot be the case with other spe-
cies. Yet, it is also true that Næss (2008, 93) expresses a preference
towards change in ontology rather than change in ethics. Therefore,
self-realization is discussed at some point as resulting in a change in
ontological views.
Interestingly, Schlosberg himself refers to “enlightened human
self-interest rather than a belief in the intrinsic value of nature” as giv-
ing rise to the recognition of the integrity of nature (Schlosberg 2007,
138). Does this not sound similar to Næss’s idea that self-realization and
identification with non-human nature brings nature into the sphere of a
person’s self-interest? For Schlosberg, the enlightened self-interest takes
the form of a rational and moral attitude. Whether that is the case with
Næss (instead of more metaphysical changes), cannot be answered here.
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The arguments Næss makes regarding self-realization are partly contra-
dictory and vague, and I refrain from making a statement on whether or
not the idea of enlightened human self-interest is relevantly similar to the
idea of self-realization. That question is beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, the ambiguity that relates to a personal ecosophy does not
undermine the point that deep ecology itself does not require adopting a
particular metaphysical stance.
As previously mentioned, another difference between deep ecology
and broad ecological justice is that deep ecology emphasizes individual
and cultural change, whereas broad ecological justice mostly deals with
the institutional realms as a theory of justice. Schlosberg leaves the indi-
vidual lifestyle choices and value issues out of the discussion. In my view,
this difference in focus is explained by deep ecology being not only a
philosophical discourse but also an environmental movement aiming to
make people feel motivated to start the change themselves, similar to the
Norwegian ‘The Future in Our Hands’ movement (Næss 1989, 88–91).
The argument in these movements is that change is needed in both indi-
vidual lifestyles and on a political and institutional level: neither of them
can be demanded to change ‘first’, but the change must happen concur-
rently on both levels.
An important consequence of the individual and cultural focus in
deep ecology is that it provides a rich collection of valuable points con-
cerning the recognition dimension of ecological justice, as recognition is
related to culture and values. Although Schlosberg (2007, 131–42) clearly
talks about the importance of recognition in ecological justice, he remains
at the level of general discussion about the types of recognition and that
further work on the recognition of non-humans would be required to
develop broad ecological justice. In this respect, broad ecological justice
could use the deep ecology literature as a rich resource material for find-
ing instances and examples on how the recognition of non-human nature
can emerge.
As the differences discussed above are differences in degree rather
than in kind, I propose it would make sense to acknowledge that the
‘broadness’ in broad ecological justice has a remarkably similar charac-
ter with the ‘deepness’ in deep ecology. While this remark is valuable in
its own right and contributes to the literature of comparative analyses
on environmental ethics, there are more interesting questions. Are these
findings on the similarity useful in any way? Does deep ecology offer
something that could help develop broad ecological justice? I suggest the
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answer is positive: broad ecological justice can indeed learn from deep
ecology (and ecosophy T). Three points in which broad ecology could
benefit from adopting certain ideas from deep ecological thought are dis-
cussed below.
1. Decreasing the gap between theory and practice. Schlosberg
(2007, 5) mentions that one of his main aims is to overcome the gap
between (broad) justice theory and environmental justice movements.
He approaches this gap from the theoretical perspective; deep ecology,
along with its ecosophy dimension, combines elements peculiar to move-
ments and theories. While this probably explains the vagueness and
weaknesses found in deep ecological thought, it nevertheless provides
fruitful material for the broad ecological justice project to overcome the
theory–practice gap. The ‘Apron diagram’ of deep ecology could prove
to be useful in conceptualizing these relationships in broad ecological
justice, as well as discussing the dialogical interaction between move-
ments and theories.
2. Expanding the discussion concerning cultural pluralism. Although
deep ecology has been accused of advocating strict cultural monism,
as the different passages in this article illustrate, there are no strong
grounds on which to assert this. Næss endorses cultural pluralism as far
as it is exercised within the limits of sustainability. Moreover, he crit-
icizes the disrespect of traditional, non-industrialized cultures and the
attempt to ‘rationalize’ those cultures by implementing Western ideas
and practices into their communities, and applies the recognition-like
principle in these discussions (Næss 2008, 281–83; 1989, 100–02, 212).
Even though Næssian criticism of technology transfer may be consid-
ered a bit exaggerated, the link he makes between the recognition of
cultures, cultural pluralism, and ecological justice provides a variety of
insightful arguments for the discourse of broad ecological (and environ-
mental) justice.
3. One solution to the reconciliation of human and non-human
flourishing. Cripps (2010) has examined the strengths and weaknesses
of Schlosberg’s extended capabilities approach, asking whether it can
do justice to humans, animals, and ecosystems. ‘Doing justice to all’
has turned out challenging due to the extent of inevitable conflicts of
interest. Although the works of Næss do not provide a magic cure to
the problems raised by Cripps, his ecosophy offers an individual-level
example of how human and non-human flourishing can be reconciled
to a remarkable extent. What is needed for a broader cultural change
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and cultural recognition of non-human nature is a difficult question and
goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, cultures change over time
and in a sense, have evolutionary resilience that keeps them dynamic,
like other socio-ecological systems (Davoudi et al. 2012, 302). Change
is possible.
The similarities between deep ecology and broad ecological justice do
not diminish the value of Schlosberg’s approach. Rather, this similarity
strengthens the argument made by Schlosberg that broad ecological jus-
tice has potential as a theory that successfully captures the essential fea-
tures of environmental movements and helps to create dialogue between
theory and practice. I suggest that this dialogue can be even broader and
more productive than Schlosberg perhaps has himself proposed. As my
comparison shows, broad ecological justice discourse has the possibility
to promote agreement between ecocentric and anthropocentric environ-
mentalists as well as those who endorse rejecting the whole notion of
different centrisms.
To recapitulate, broad ecological justice has two specific advantages
as a theory of ecological justice. First, it helps to view the injustice as a
deeper and broader question, tackling the impediments of justice that are
rooted in the societal structures and social and cultural practices. Second,
it provides theoretical and grammatical tools for overcoming the gap
between justice theories and movements, promoting constructive dialogue
between these different strands of environmental thought. Broad ecolog-
ical justice is a valuable project that deserves further development. Thus,
it is useful to acknowledge its similarities with deep ecology and insights
from deep ecology could help to advance the broad discourse forward,
making it even broader—or deeper.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Mikko Yrjönsuuri, Markku Oksanen and Arto
Laitinen for helpful comments. I am also grateful for the anonymous
reviewers who made valuable suggestions for improvement. This
research has been funded by Finnish Cultural Foundation and Kone
Foundation.
NOTES
1 In this paper, environmental justice concerns environmental problems and risks
within human societies, whereas ecological justice concerns human-nature
relations and the effects humans have on non-human nature. The terms are
often intertwined in the works of Schlosberg.
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TEEA KORTETMÄKI is a Ph.D. student at the University of Jyväskylä.
She received her master’s degree in philosophy from the University of
Jyväskylä in 2011. Her research interests include environmental ethics,
food ethics, and the capabilities approach. E-mail: teea.kortetmaki@jyu.fi
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